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May It Rest in Peace: Public Interest
and Public Access in the Post-
Fairness Doctrine Era
by RICHARD E. LABUNSKI*
Introduction
The broadcasting industry has been subject, almost from
birth, to technical and content regulations imposed on no
other media. The primary justification for federal regulation
was the physical limitation of the electromagnetic spectrum,
which can accomodate only a fixed number of frequencies.
Because there are substantially more individuals who want to
broadcast than frequencies to allocate, complex rules were de-
veloped that require those fortunate enough to be granted a
license to operate in the public interest.'
For more than half a century, the "scarcity" rationale justi-
fied extensive governmental intrusion into broadcast journal-
ists' first amendment rights-a level of intrusion that would
never be permitted if imposed on print organizations.2 In re-
* Assistant Professor, School of Communications, University of Washington;
B.A. 1975, M.A. 1977, Ph.D. 1979 (political science), University of California.
1. The "public interest" standard was first applied to broadcasting in the Fed-
eral Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), and was incorporated
in the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section
18 of the Act empowered the Federal Radio Commission and its successor, the Fed-
eral Communications Commission, to act "as public convenience, interest, or neces-
sity requires." See infra note 251 (suggestion by an influential broadcasting trade
journal that the public interest standard technically requires only the FCC, and not
broadcasters, to operate in the public interest).
2. Shortly after Congress passed the Federal Radio Act, the Federal Radio
Commission issued a statement advising licensees how to comply with the public
interest standard. Statement Made by the Commission Relative to Public Interest,
Convenience or Necessity, 2 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 166 (1928). Other early regulatory
policies and court decisions relating to content included: In the Matter of the Appli-
cation of Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32 (1929) (clarifying the
public interest standard in a comparative hearing proceeding); KFBK Broadcasting
Association v. Federal Radio Commission, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (first judicial
affirmation of the FRC's right to consider a station's programming when deciding
whether or not to renew a license); Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Ra-
dio Commission, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932) (upholding FRC decision of denial of
license renewal because of objectionable programming); In the Matter of The
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cent years, critics of the scarcity rationale have argued that
the theory, which forces broadcasters to accept second-rate
first amendment status, is obsolete because there is now a di-
versity of electronic media outlets.3  Proponents of deregula-
tion argue that content regulations violate the Constitution,
fail to serve their intended goals, and induce self-censorship.4
These proponents recommend that "marketplace" forces, not
government, regulate the industry.'
Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1941) (statement interpreted by broad-
casters as a ban on editorializing); In re United Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945)
(extending public interest requirements); In the Matter of Editorializing by Broad-
cast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949) (clarifying Mayflower to permit editorializing,
and definitively stating Fairness Doctrine obligations).
3. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the Supreme Court identified scarcity
of resources, as well as other factors, in upholding regulations that affect the content
of broadcasting programs. 395 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1969). The Court came to the oppo-
site conclusion in a case involving a newspaper. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). Some commentators, including a former FCC chair-
man, argue that Red Lion was not based on a scarcity rationale, and, therefore,
changing conditions in the media marketplace, namely the increase in broadcast out-
lets, are irrelevant to content regulation. See Hyde, FCC Action Repealing The Fair-
ness Doctrine: A Revolution in Broadcast Regulation, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1175,
1178-80 (1987). Although scarcity and diversity are largely policy and not legal prin-
ciples, they have become an essential part of the case law related to the constitu-
tional rights of broadcasters. If there is now diversity of electronic media, then the
very foundation of broadcast regulation has been undermined, and all regulatory
policies are vulnerable to attack. See Bolton, In Stark Contravention of Its Purpose:
Federal Communications Commission Enforcement and Repeal of the Fairness Doc-
trine, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 799, 814-15 (1987). In FCC v. League of Women Voters
of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984), the Supreme Court indicated a willingness to reconsider
regulation of the industry in light of changing conditions. Justice Brennan wrote in
a footnote that
[t]he prevailing rationale for broadcast regulation based on spectrum scar-
city has come under increasing criticism in recent years. Critics, including
the incumbent Chairman of the FCC, charge that with the advent of cable
and satellite television technology, communities now have access to such a
wide variety of stations that the scarcity rationale is obsolete. We are not
prepared, however, to reconsider our longstanding approach without some
signal from Congress or the FCC that technological developments have ad-
vanced so far that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may
be required.
Id. at 376-77 n.11.
4. For a thoughtful, yet searing attack on the content regulations, see Krat-
tenmaker & Powe, The Fairness Doctrine Today: A Constitutional Curiosity and An
Impossible Dream, 1985 DuKE L.J. 151 (1985). See also L. PowE, AMERICAN BROAD-
CASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987).
5. For a detailed discussion of the marketplace theory by a former FCC chair-
man, see Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60
TEx. L. REV. 207 (1982). One of the few programming areas the Reagan administra-
tion's FCC has not left to the marketplace is control of indecent programming. See
In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp., In re Pacifica Foundation, Inc., In re Regents of
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Of all the content regulations, the most despised by broad-
casters and those proposing deregulation has been the Fair-
ness Doctrine.6 Its deceivingly simple language does not
suggest the controversy it provoked for forty years. The Doc-
trine imposed a two-pronged obligation: "Broadcast licensees
are required to provide coverage of vitally important contro-
versial issues of interest in the community served by the licen-
sees and to provide a reasonable opportunity for the
presentation of contrasting viewpoints on such issues."'7
Univ. of Cal., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3 F.C.C. Rcd. 930 (1987)(protection
of children justifies indecency regulation); see also Illinois Citizen Committee for
Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726 (1978).
6. The Fairness Doctrine is codified as a federal regulation. 47 C.F.R.
§§ 73.1910, 76.209 (1987). Other content regulations, such as the personal attack
rules, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920, and political- editorial rules, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1930, adopted in
1968, are subsections of the Fairness Doctrine. Personal attacks: "(a) When, during
the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public importance, an attack is
made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like personal qualities of an identified
person or group, the licensee shall, within a reasonable time . . . transmit to the
persons or group attacked: (1) Notification of the date, time and identification of the
broadcast; (2) A script or tape . . . of the attack; and (3) An offer of a reasonable
opportunity to respond over the licensee's facilities." Id. at § 73.1920 (a). The regula-
tion allows exceptions for legally qualified candidates, foreign public figures, and at-
tacks during bona fide newscasts, news interviews, and on-the-spot coverage of bona
fide news events. Id at § 73.1920 (b). Political Editorials: "Where a licensee, in an
editorial, endorses or opposes a legally qualified candidate or candidates, the licensee
shall . . . transmit to . . . other qualified candidate or candidates for the same office
or the candidate opposed in the editorial ... an offer of reasonable opportunity.., to
respond over the licensee's facilities." Id. at § 73.1930. See Public Media Center v.
FCC, 587 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (applying the Fairness Doctrine to ballot adver-
tising). Related regulations include 47 U.S.C. § 315(a), the equal opportunity re-
quirement: "If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified
candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal
opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcast-
ing station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the
material broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed
under this subsection upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such
candidate." See Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding constitution-
ality of the equal-time rules); 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (revocation of station license for
failure to give "reasonable access" to federal candidates). See also In re Request by
Nicholas Zapple, Communications Counsel, Comm. on Commerce, 23 F.C.C.2d 707
(1970) [hereinafter Zapple] (applying equal time rules to appearances of supporters
of candidates); Letter from Ben F. Waple, Secretary, to Cullman Broadcasting Co.,
40 F.C.C. 576 (1963) [hereinafter Cullman] (creating the Cullman Doctrine, which
requires broadcasters to present opposing views when a controversial issue of public
importance is presented in sponsored programming).
7. In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcasting Licensees,
102 F.C.C.2d 143, 146 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Fairness Report]. The Commission's
report, The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
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The goal of the Fairness Doctrine was to provide diversity of
opinion on controversial subjects by requiring broadcasters to
ascertain what issues are important in their community and to
air differing viewpoints on programs dealing with those is-
sues.' The Doctrine's constitutional basis was the "right of the
public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences .... 9
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) abolished
the Fairness Doctrine on August 7, 1987.10 For much of its his-
tory, the Fairness Doctrine was treated like an illegitimate
child no one wanted. Broadcasters, who viewed it as a symbol
of their second-rate first amendment status, either ignored or
vilified it." The FCC enforced it unevenly or not at all, while
Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974) [hereinafter
1974 Fairness Report], provided a slightly different summary of the Fairness
Doctrine:
Stripped to its bare essentials, the Fairness Doctrine involves a two-fold
duty: (1) the broadcaster must devote a reasonable percentage of broadcast
time to the coverage of public issues; and (2) his coverage of these issues
must be fair in the sense that it provides an opportunity for the presenta-
tion of contrasting points of view.
Id. at 7. It is significant that in each report, the Commission referred to a single
Fairness Doctrine with dual obligations, rather than separate policies. This issue be-
came important when the Commission eliminated the Fairness Doctrine, and some
argued that the part one requirement should have been retained. See Syracuse
Peace Council, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043, at paras. 33-35.
8. An important principle in the public interest standard is "localism," namely
that broadcasters must air programs dealing with the issues in their community. See
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). Today, the relation-
ship between networks and their affiliates undermines the principle of localism. See
Nader & Riley, Oh, Say Can You See: A Broadcast Network for the Audience, 5 J.L.
& POL. 1, 48 n.246, 55 n.292 (1988). Also note that the Doctrine implicity requires
broadcasters to ascertain what issues are important in their community.
9. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390. Krattenmaker and Powe attack the notion that
the first amendment can be applied this way: "No principle could be more at odds
with the bulk of first amendment jurisprudence, for it would justify any governmen-
tal rule that told a speaker what to say on the ground that the government had
determined the public should hear it." Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 4, at 155.
10. Syracuse Peace Council, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F.C.C. Red.
5043 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Syracuse], affl'd, Nos. 87-1516, 87-1544, 1989 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1475 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 10, 1989).
11. Broadcasters' criticism of the Doctrine was often hyperbolic, for the FCC
granted them wide discretion in fulfilling the Doctrine's requirements. For example,
the Commission almost always accepted the licensee's assertion that it made a "rea-
sonable" effort to present contrasting viewpoints even when it was unsuccessful in
doing so. Since 1981, the FCC has upheld only one out of the tens of thousands of
Fairness Doctrine complaints filed against broadcasters and sustained that complaint
only to provide a test case for challenging the constitutionality of the doctrine. Bol-
ton, supra note 3, at 820-21 n.97. See Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir.
1989] POST-FAIRNESS DOCTRINE ERA
Congress, which claimed parentage based on the assumption
that the Doctrine had been codified into statute in a 1959
amendment to the Communications Act, insisted that the FCC
enforce it.12
Few public policy or constitutional questions are more im-
portant or perplexing than how to regulate the industry which
sixty to seventy percent of the American people claim is their
primary source of news.'3 The prominent role broadcasting
has assumed in disseminating information could hardly have
been envisioned by its pioneers. 14 At the same time that over-
the-air broadcasting has prospered and new technologies, such
as cable, have provided more outlets for information, the
newspaper industry has undergone changes resulting in in-
creased concentration of ownership and the closing of newspa-
pers in several major cities.' 5 Continued regulation of
broadcasting in a changing media marketplace, while no simi-
1987). See also infra notes 200-16 and accompanying text; Nader & Riley, supra note
8, at 28 n.134.
12. The FCC has occasionally enforced the Fairness Doctrine with a vengeance,
making all the clearer the difficulty of enforcing the Doctrine without violating the
first amendment rights of broadcasters. In Brandywine-Main Line Radio, 24
F.C.C.2d 2218 (1970), aff 'd, Brandywine-Main Line Radio v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), the FCC revoked the license of Philadelphia radio station WXUR for de-
viating from promises to obey the Fairness Doctrine by airing one-sided religious
programs. WXUR has the dubious honor of being the only station to lose a license
primarily on Fairness Doctrine grounds. In In re Complaint of Accuracy in Media
Against National Broadcasting Co., 44 F.C.C.2d 1027 (1973), the FCC upheld a com-
plaint against the NBC television network that it had failed to properly balance a
documentary on private pension plans. The FCC was reversed in National Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The case represents the most
startling misuse of the Fairness Doctrine and demonstrated the Doctrine's funda-
mental constitutional flaws. See generally F. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD Guys, THE BAD
Guys, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 142-66 (1977).
13. Television Information Office/Roper, America's Watching: Public Attitudes
Toward Television (1987) (The report states that 66% of Americans mention televi-
sion as a main news source, compared to 36% who mention newspapers, 14% who
cite radio, and 4% who say magazines. Id. at 4.).
14. As of February 20, 1989, there were 11,626 radio stations and 1,675 full-power
television stations operating in the United States. In addition, there were 1,814 low-
power television stations, and 8,000 cable TV systems serving nearly 49 million sub-
scribers. By the Numbers, BROADCASTING, Feb. 20, 1989, at 12.
15. In 1982, only 35 cities were served by two or more competing daily newspa-
pers. In contrast, very few American cities have only one radio or television station.
Fowler & Brenner, supra note 5, at 225 n.82. The comparison to newspapers is ap-
propriate because those who argue that there is no longer scarcity in broadcasting
point to the newspaper industry, with only 1,735 daily papers, as an example of real
scarcity.
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lar regulations apply to newspapers, raises important and diffi-
cult issues.
The Fairness Doctrine was not subject to more exacting ju-
dicial scrutiny because the scarcity rationale underlying regu-
lation of the industry was thought sufficient to justify the
application of lower standards for measuring constitutional-
ity.16 Yet, as the scarcity rationale is undermined, it is increas-
ingly difficult to argue for retaining the Fairness Doctrine on
either constitutional or policy grounds. 7 That the Fairness
Doctrine is impossible to comprehensively enforce, and vio-
lates constitutional rights when it is applied, makes the argu-
ment for abolition stronger. If the scarcity rationale is
obsolete, it is unlikely that the government will be able to
demonstrate a compelling need for such a restriction on first
amendment rights.
The "scarcity-diversity" question is, however, more complex
than proponents of deregulation are willing to concede. While
there may be "macro" diversity in the aggregate number of
16. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 4, at 154-55. Compare New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (government failed
to carry heavy burden required to support prior restraint on newspaper's publication
of classified material) and Near v. Minnesota ex. rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713, 721-23
(1931) (statute authorizing public officials to bring publishers of "malicious, scandal-
ous and defamatory" periodicals before a judge to prove material is true and pub-
lished in good faith found unconstitutional as restraint on freedom of expression)
with United States v. The Progressive Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 997-1000 (W.D. Wis.
1979) (upholding restraining order enjoining publication of restrictive data detailing
method for constructing hydrogen bomb because vital national security interests out-
weighed constitutional doctrine against prior restraint).
Because the first amendment is in a "preferred position," any law restricting free
speech must be justified by a compelling governmental interest. For development of
the "preferred position" theory, see Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (pre-
sumption supporting legislation must be weighed against preference given to free-
doms of the first amendment); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (it
is immaterial that ordinance is nondiscriminatory because first amendment rights
stand in preferred position and cannot be easily restricted); Jones v. Opelika, 316
U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the Constitution places free-
dom of expression in a preferred position), vacated, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (per curiam)
(reaffirming reasoning in Murdock); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937) (stating that
freedom of expression is essential to all other freedoms). See generally R. LABUN.
SKI, LIBEL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: LEGAL HISTORY AND PRACTICE IN PRINT AND
BROADCASTING (1987).
17. In Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501
(D.C. Cir. 1986), Judge Bork wrote: "Since scarcity is a universal fact, it can hardly
explain regulation in one context and not another. The attempt to use a universal
fact as a distinguishing principle necessarily leads to analytical confusion." Id. at
508.
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communication outlets, there is still "micro" scarcity in that
only one broadcaster at a time occupies a frequency. Without
some content regulation or mandated access, a licensee given
exclusive use of a valuable channel could exclude all view-
points with which it does not agree.18 While a broadcaster
must make a commitment to serve the public interest, which
presumably would not be served by partisan use of a fre-
quency, such a standard is so loosely defined that only the
most egregious noncompliance would result in FCC
sanctions. 19
Scarcity, therefore, is not dead, and while past content regu-
lations have not been effectively enforced, it does not follow
that broadcasters' use of a limited public resource should be
completely unregulated.
No new Fairness Doctrine, no matter how creatively writ-
ten, will be able to achieve its stated goals. If Congress were
to pass a new Fairness Doctrine, it would inevitably become
mired in the constitutional and policy issues that plagued the
original Fairness Doctrine throughout its forty-year history.
The question of how to require broadcasters to serve the pub-
lic interest by presenting contrasting viewpoints on controver-
sial issues, without violating their first amendment rights, has
never been, and cannot be, satisfactorily answered.2 °
Even if the constitutional obstacles could be overcome, the
FCC would still be unable to successfully enforce the Doc-
trine. With its relatively small budget and staff, the FCC is
not only concerned with broadcast programs, but also regu-
lates the entire electromagnetic spectrum, all interstate tele-
18. Proponents of the "marketplace" theory argue that if there is strong public
demand for balanced news and public affairs programming, broadcasters would al-
ways provide programs on important community issues, even in the absence of FCC
requirements. See Dyk, Full First Amendment Freedom for Broadcasters: The In-
dustry as Eliza on the Ice and Congress as the Friendly Overseer, 5 YALE J. ON REG.
299, 317 (1988). Some evidence suggests that deregulation has negatively affected
news and public affairs programming. See Stone, RTNDA Communicator, Apr. 1987,
at 9.
19. See National Ass'n of Indep. Television Producers & Distributors v. FCC, 516
F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that allowing broadcasters to determine what consti-
tutes the public interest poses an inherent conflict of interest).
20. The Communications Act specifically prohibits the government from impos.
ing censorship: "Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the
Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals trans-
mitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or
fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by
means of radio communications." 47 U.S.C. § 426 (1987).
1989]
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phone and telegraph service, all American satellites, and all
the technical operations of its broadcast licensees. With so
many radio and television stations broadcasting hundreds of
news and public affairs programs each year, it is impossible for
the FCC to regulate the industry except by singling out for
punishment on an ad hoc basis an extremely unlucky broad-
caster whose transgressions are so egregious that they result
in sanctions.21
The solution to accommodating both the broadcasters' and
the public's rights may lie not in any of the traditional argu-
ments either for or against content regulations, but in a new
approach. This Article proposes a regulatory scheme by which
Congress would amend the Communications Act to grant
those denied a license access to the public airwaves for one
hour per week to present contrasting points of view on impor-
tant issues and to criticize the performance of the incumbent
broadcaster. Such a forum currently does not exist.2
Broadcasters, in return for surrendering control for one
hour per week of their frequencies, will be granted, on an ex-
perimental basis, full first amendment parity with print jour-
nalists during their allotted time period. This accommodation
of interests will give broadcasters the freedom they have long
sought, while still recognizing the public's interest in main-
taining access to a limited resource.23
21. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 4, at 164; Chamberlin, Lessons in Reg-
ulating Information Flow: The FCC's Weak Track Record in Interpreting the Public
Interest Standard, 60 N.C.L. REV. 1057 (1982).
22. Although developed independently, this proposal shares some characteristics
with Ralph Nader's "Audience Network," a non-profit membership organization that
would be granted one hour of prime-time television and one hour of drive-time radio
on every commercial station each day. Audience Network would also represent
broadcast consumer interests before the FCC, Congress, and the courts. See Nader
& Riley, supra note 8. When compared with Nader's Audience Network, the propo-
sal in this Article is much more modest in nature, beginning, for example, with one
hour per week, as opposed to one hour each day. See infra text accompanying notes
296-312.
23. In several non-first amendment areas, broadcasters have already won sub-
stantial victories against the FCC. The Commission, for example, increased the
number of stations that any one broadcaster could own from seven AM, seven FM,
and seven TV, to twelve AM, twelve FM and twelve TV, provided that their signals
do not reach more than 25 percent of all households. 47 CFR § 73.3555(d)(1)-(2)
(1987). Congress increased the length of the license terms from three years for both
radio and TV, to five years for TV and seven years for radio. 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)
(West Supp. 1988). The Commission also repealed the rule that required broadcast-
ers to keep their licenses for at least three years before selling their stations, to
prevent "trafficking" of broadcast properties. Amendment of the Commission's
(Vol. 11:219
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Part I of this Article traces the development of the Fairness
Doctrine and other content regulations. Part II describes how
the Fairness Doctrine has been interpreted and applied by the
Federal Communications Commission and the courts. Part III
examines the FCC reports and court cases that led to the de-
mise and abolition of the Fairness Doctrine. Part IV considers
the regulatory environment in the post-Fairness Doctrine era.
Part V, which fully explains the above proposal, suggests
changes in the Communications Act that would allow access to
the public airwaves by those who do not have a broadcasting
license. The Article concludes that, after sixty years of regu-
lating broadcasting, no workable method has yet been found
which accommodates the public's interest in a scarce resource
while respecting the first amendment rights of broadcasters.
I
Evolution of the Fairness Doctrine
The Fairness Doctrine began as vague language related to
the public interest standard in the Radio Act of 1927,24 which
was carried forward verbatim to the Communications Act of
1934.25 The public interest standard of the Act evolved follow-
ing enactment of the Radio Act through statements and rul-
ings by the Federal Radio Commission (FRC). In a 1929
decision,2 6 the FRC discussed the broadcasters' obligation to
Rules Regarding Applications for Voluntary Assignments or Transfers of Control, 47
Fed. Reg. 55,924 (1982). The FCC also eliminated the rule that limited broadcasters
to 16 minutes of commercials per hour. In re The Revision of Programming and
Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log Re-
quirements for Commercial Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 1102 (1984).
24. Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). The Doctrine's genesis is found in
§ 9: "The licensing authority (FRC), if public convenience, interest or necessity will
be served thereby, subject to the limitations of this Act, shall grant to any applicant
therefore a station license provided by this Act." Section 11 stated that a license
should be renewed if the broadcasters had served the "public interest." Section 18
was the equal time provision that was transferred to the Communications Act of
1934. Section 29, which became § 326 of the Communications Act of 1934, denied the
FRC the "power of censorship over radio communications," and provided that "no
regulation... shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio commu-
nications." 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The FRC considered the public
interest standard to include the presentation of balanced programming. See 1 F.R.C.
Ann. Rep. 159 (1927); 2 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 166 (1928) (FRC discusses the public inter-
est standard).
25. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
26. Great Lakes Broadcasting Company, 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32 (1929).
1989]
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provide equal time to political candidates, as set forth in sec-
tion 18 of the Act." The FRC noted:
It would not be fair, indeed it would not be good service to the
public to allow a one-sided presentation of the political issues
of a campaign. In so far as a program consists of discussion of
public questions, public interest requires ample play for the
free and fair competition of opposing views, and the commis-
sion believes that the principle applies not only to addresses
by political candidates but to all discussion of issues of impor-
tance to the public.28
In 1940, the FCC, as the FRC's successor, further defined
the fairness requirement in In the Matter of Mayflower Broad-
casting Corporation.2 9 In finding that a broadcaster violated
the public interest standard by presenting editorials only on
issues and candidates he supported, the FCC used language
that broadcasters interpreted as an absolute ban on
editorializing.3 0
The requirement that broadcasters present programs deal-
ing with controversial issues was developed in In re United
Broadcasting Company.31 In that case the Commission held
27. The FRC noted that in § 18 the Act stated that "no obligation is hereby im-
posed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate." Fed-
eral Radio Act of 1927, supra note 1.
28. Great Lakes Broadcasting Companzy, 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. at 33. To enforce
this "fairness" requirement, the FRC required broadcasters to keep detailed logs
that included information about the political backgrounds of those who appeared on
radio programs, and the subjects of the broadcasts. 5 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 96 (1931).
The FRC reviewed the logs at the time of license renewal to monitor the program
performance of stations. The logging requirements were ended in 1981 as part of the
deregulation of radio. See In re Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981).
29. 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940).
30. The Commission wrote:
[T]he public interest can never be served by a dedication of any broadcast
facility to the support of [the broadcaster's] own partisan ends. Radio can
serve as an instrument of democracy only when devoted to the communica-
tion of information and the exchange of ideas fairly and objectively
presented. A truly free radio cannot be used to advocate the causes of the
licensee. It cannot be used to support the candidacies of his friends. It can-
not be devoted to the support of principles he happens to regard most favor-
ably. In brief, the broadcaster cannot be an advocate.
Id. at 340.
Because the radio station had discontinued the practice of editorializing, and for
other reasons, the FCC renewed the station's license. In FCC v. League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), the Supreme Court struck down provisions in the Public
Broadcasting Act of 1967 that prohibited any noncommercial educational broadcast-
ing station that received funds from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting to en-
gage in editorializing.
31. 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945).
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that the refusal of an Ohio radio station to sell time to groups
that wanted to discuss race, religion or politics was "inconsis-
tent with the concept of the public interest. 3 2
The Doctrine in its modern form became an FCC policy in
1949. as The Commission became concerned that broadcasters
had overreacted to Mayflower and misunderstood their re-
sponsibilities to serve the public interest. The confusion was
understandable because, while the Commission mandated that
broadcasters cover important issues and present balanced re-
porting of such issues, it also prohibited them from advocating
positions in editorials. These and other problems led to the
Commission's report in In the Matter of Editorializing by
Broadcast Licensees that firmly established the Fairness Doc-
trine as FCC policy.3 4
The Editorializing report reversed the Mayflower decision
by holding that broadcasters could editorialize.35 The FCC
considered advocacy to be "just one of several types of presen-
tation of public issues."36 More importantly, the Commission
also specifically reaffirmed the public interest standard in the
Communications Act that required broadcasters to present
balanced coverage of important issues.
Ten years later, Congress amended section 315 of the Com-
munications Act to exempt newscasts from the equal time pro-
32. Id, at para. 6. The part one requirement of the Fairness Doctrine has rarely
been invoked by the Commission. See Complaint of Patsy Mink, Environmental Pol-
icy Center and O.D. Hagedon v. WHAR, 59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 137-48.
33. In the Matter of Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
34. Id.
35. Id at paras. 11-17.
36. Id, at para. 14. The Commission added:
We do not believe that programs in which the licensee's personal opinions
are expressed are intrinsically more or less subject to abuse than any other
program devoted to public issues.... Assurance of fairness must in the final
analysis be achieved, not by the exclusion of particular views because of the
source of the views, or the forcefulness with which the view is expressed,
but by making the microphone available for the presentation of contrary
views without deliberate restrictions designed to impede equally forceful
presentation.
Id.
37. The report held that broadcasters have "an affirmative responsibility ... to
provide a reasonable amount of time for the presentation ... of programs devoted to
the discussion and consideration of public issues .... ." Id at para. 7. It further held
that the public has a "paramount right.., to be informed and to have presented to it
for acceptance or rejection the different attitudes and viewpoints concerning these
vital and often controversial issues ..... Id. at para. 6.
1989]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J. [Vol. 11:219
visions"8 and included language which seemed to codify the
Fairness Doctrine. 9
II
Implementation of the Fairness Doctrine
Although it created the Fairness Doctrine, the Commission
found it difficult to develop standards by which to evaluate
whether broadcasters were fulfilling their fairness obliga-
tions.40 Eventually, formal and informal rules and practices
developed that revealed the Commission's uneasiness in
strictly enforcing the Doctrine.41 The FCC largely ignored the
Fairness Doctrine for long periods of time,42 then suddenly
used it to strip the license of a broadcaster with a poor record
of public service, 43 and applied it under the wrong circum-
stances in attempting to correct what it perceived to be "im-
balances" in a network documentary." The result has been a
policy that satisfies neither broadcasters nor those who want
the industry to be closely monitored and regulated.
The Fairness Doctrine's bark, when it was heard at all, was
much worse than its bite. A literal reading of the Doctrine
could lead to the conclusion that it was a serious menace to
broadcasting. The image conveyed was that of a federal
agency which, after evaluating the programs of thousands of
38. Unlike the Fairness Doctrine, which applies to a broadcaster's overall pro-
gramming and allows substantial discretion in how its obligations are to be fulfilled,
the equal time provisions relating to political campaigns impose strict requirements
that include a one-to-one balance of airtime for candidates. The 1959 amendment
exempted from § 315 an appearance by legally qualified candidates on any: (1) bona
fide newscast; (2) bona fide news interview; (3) bona fide news documentary (if the
appearance of the candidate is incidental to the presentation of the subject or sub-jects covered by the news documentary); or (4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide
news events (including but not limited to political conventions and activities inciden-
tal thereto). Pub. L; No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557 (1959).
39. Following the changes to the equal time provision was the following para-
graph: "Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcast-
ers, in connection with the presentations of newscasts, news interviews, news
documentaries, and on-the-spot news coverage of news events, from the obligation
imposed upon them under this Act to operate in the public interest and to afford
reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public im-
portance." Id
40. See. Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 4, at 157-62.
41. See Bolton, supra note 3, at 812-25.
42. Id at 820-25 & nn.94-97.
43. See Brandywine-Main Line Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 18 (1970), aff'd, 473 F.2d 16
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
44. See NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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radio and television stations, ordered nervous broadcasters to
correct perceived programming imbalances based on govern-
ment-imposed standards of fairness. The potential sanctions
available to the FCC, including the most serious penalty of li-
cense revocation, were thought by some to induce timidity and
self-censorship.
Apparently because the Commission disliked the Fairness
Doctrine, it gave broadcasters substantial discretion in fulfil-
ling its requirements. Broadcasters usually needed to do noth-
ing more than assert that they made a "reasonable" effort to
comply. A 1964 FCC report, called the "Primer,"45 outlined
the procedures to be followed by a party bringing a Fairness
Doctrine complaint and effectively ensured that all but a few
complaints would be dismissed. According to the Primer, the
complainant was to submit specific information indicating: (1)
the particular station involved; (2) the particular issue of a
controversial nature discussed over the air; (3) the date and
time when the program was carried; (4) the basis for the claim
that the station had presented only one side of the question;
and (5) whether the station had afforded or has plans to af-
ford, an opportunity for the presentation of contrasting
viewpoints.46
The first and third requirements were easily satisfied. The
second, however, was more difficult for the complainant than
it may first appear because the Commission accepted a broad-
caster's response that a program was neither controversial nor
a matter of public importance,47 unless there was evidence
that the broadcaster's determination was arbitrary or capri-
cious.4a As long as the broadcaster made a good-faith judg-
ment that the issue was not controversial, the FCC usually
accepted that decision.49
45. Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Is-
sues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10,415, 10,416 (1964). Prior to the "Primer,"
the Commission considered Fairness Doctrine complaints only at license renewal
time. The Primer stated that the FCC would consider complaints from the public at
the time of the broadcast. I&.
46. Id. Approximately 99% of Fairness Doctrine complaints are rejected out-
right because the complainant did not provide the necessary information. D.
PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 591 (1987).
47. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
48. D. PEMBER, supra note 46, at 592.
49. One observer wrote that only when the "station's position is so 'off the wall'
that no reasonable person could accept it" will the FCC question the broadcaster. F.
RowAN, supra note 47, at 65. For example, in 1980, the FCC requested only 28
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The fourth and fifth requirements were the most difficult
for the complainant because the Fairness Doctrine did not ap-
ply to a particular program, but rather to a broadcaster's over-
all programming. Thus, to satisfy requirement five, the
complainant would either have to know, or learn from the li-
censee, whether the licensee had ever presented, or was going
to present, contrasting viewpoints on the issue. 0 Considering
the burdens placed on a viewer or listener who attempted to
bring a Fairness Doctrine violation to the attention of the
Commission, it is remarkable that any complaint was upheld.
Despite the obstacles that had to be overcome, broadcasters ar-
gue that the Fairness Doctrine presented a dangerous threat
to their industry.
The Fairness Doctrine has not been used to strip broadcast-
ers of their licenses.51 In only one case has the Fairness Doc-
trine formed the basis for revocation of a license,52 and even
then the court tried to avoid the constitutional issues by hold-
ing that "misrepresentations" to the Commission about how
the licensee would fulfill its fairness obligations, rather than
violation of the Doctrine itself, led to the revocation. Those
few who have lost licenses have been guilty of other serious
transgressions."
broadcasters to respond to Fairness Doctrine and political broadcasting complaints,
even though the Commission received an estimated 20,000 complaints in all. Ferris
& Kirkland, Fairness-The Broadcaster's Hippocratic Oath, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 605,
614 (1985).
50. See In re Complaint of Diocesan Union of Holy Name Societies, 43 F.C.C.2d
548 (1973) (N. Johnson, Commissioner, dissenting) (suggesting thai complainant
must do extensive monitoring of the station to bring a successful Fairness Doctrine
complaint). See also In Re Complaint of Accuracy in Media, Inc., 44 F.C.C.2d 958, 960(1973) (NBC, in responding to a fairness complaint against a documentary, told the
Commission that it had "formulated no definite plans to present further program-
ming related to the subject [private pension plans] . . . in the future." Id. at 967).
51. For example, out of the tens of thousands of Fairness Doctrine complaints
filed with the Commission in the period 1982-1986, only twenty-four cases made it to
the appeals process at the Commission, and only one was decided against the broad-
caster, largely for the purpose of providing a test case for challenging the doctrine in
court. See Bolton, supra note 3, at 820. See generally F. RowAN, BROADCAST FAIR-
NESS: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, PROSPECTS (1984); S. SIMMONS, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
AND THE MEDIA (1978); L. POwE, BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987).
52. Brandywine-Main Line Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 18 (1970), aff'd, 473 F.2d 16 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
53. The Commission has denied license renewal for a station's abdication of con-
trol over programs, In re Application of Trustees of the Univ. of Pa., WXPN (FM),
71 F.C.C.2d 416 (1979); for persistent violation of operating rules, In re Applications
of United Television, 55 F.C.C.2d 416 (1975); and for not carrying network programs
to insert local advertising and thereafter misrepresenting this conduct to the FCC,
[Vol. 11:219
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The FCC has been reluctant to strip incumbent broadcasters
of their licenses because of the severe economic ramifications
of such an action54 Broadcasters claim that license revocation
creates instability and uncertainty in the industry. Because in-
vestment in a station is high, broadcasters must expect license
renewal except in the most unusual cases.5 The FCC has re-
In re Applications of Western Communications, Inc., 59 F.C.C.2d 1441 (1976). Revo-
cation has occurred for misrepresentations in connection with fraudulent billing
practices. In re Revocation of the License of Sea Island Broadcasting Corp., 60
F.C.C.2d 146 (1976). The Commission has struggled for years with the question of
what constitutes sufficiently good character for a broadcast licensee. See In re Policy
Regarding Character Qualifications in Broadcast Licensing, 102 F.C.C.2d 1179 (1986).
For cases in which the FCC refused to renew a broadcaster's license for serious
violations of the Commission's rules, see, e.g., Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson
Brothers, 289 U.S. 266 (1933); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co, 309 U.S. 134 (1940)
(upholding decision to deny license to applicant whom the Commission found to be
unqualified financially); FCC v. WOKO, 329 U.S. 223 (1946) (upholding decision of
FCC to deny license to station that had concealed the identity of a major stockholder
who was trying to secure affiliation with the CBS Radio Network for the station).
The FRC refused to renew licenses in the early days of radio on the basis of content.
See Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Commission, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C.
Cir. 1932) (court of appeals upheld FRC's decision not to renew license of a station
whose owner broadcast attacks against religious and governmental institutions).
Compare Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (holding that prior restraint will be
permitted only under the most limited circumstances) with KFBK Broadcasting
Ass'n v. Federal Radio Commission, 47 F.2d 670 (1932) (upholding denial of license
renewal to Kansas doctor who used station as part of his practice by diagnosing and
treating medical cases from letters sent to the station).
54. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 5, at 209, 212. Termination of a broadcast
license is economic and constitutional capital punishment, and must be reserved for
only the most serious cases. Broadcasting properties have become so valuable that
removing the license of a good-sized station may be the equivalent of imposing a fine
as large as hundreds of millions of dollars. In most cases, the punishment seemingly
exceeds the crime.
Although broadcasters do not own their licenses, when they sell their stations, the
sale is always contingent upon the FCC approving the license transfer, which it al-
most always does. Thus, a broadcaster has free, exclusive use of a public resource
which may be worth millions of dollars. When sold, the broadcaster keeps the prof-
its. See infra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
55. Justice Frankfurter wrote in 1940:
It is highly significant that although investment in broadcasting stations
may be large, a license may not be issued for more than three years; and in
deciding whether to renew the license, just as in deciding whether to issue it
in the first place, the Commission must judge by the standard of "public
convenience, interest or necessity."
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Company, 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
Under the Communications Act, broadcasters acquire no ownership rights to their
frequencies. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 209(h)(1) (1982). They are licensed for a fixed period
of time-seven years for radio and five years for TV-after which they must seek
renewal of that license on the basis of their record of serving the public interest. 47
U.S.C. § 307(c) (1982) (license renewal); §§ 303, 307(a) (1982) (public interest stan-
dard). The process by which broadcasters have their licenses renewed has been the
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sponded to broadcaster pressure on comparative renewal by
subject of much controversy. Although the Communications Act does not require
the FCC to favor existing licensees over challengers, the industry's renewal record is
almost perfect. It is virtually impossible for a challenger to win the license of an
incumbent broadcaster. No television station has ever lost a license on comparative
grounds. In Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971), the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the Commission's
decision to award the license of WHDH-TV in Boston to a competing applicant.
While the issue of who was to operate the station had been clouded because four
mutually exclusive applications were filed in 1954, one reason for the decision to
award the license to a competing applicant was improper ex parte contacts between a
station employee and the chairman of the FCC. As a result, the station was stripped
of any advantage of incumbency. Id at 845. In the last forty years, only two televi-
sion broadcasters have lost licenses through petitions to deny. See Office of Commu-
nication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969), discussed
infra notes 84-105 and accompanying text; and Alabama Educational TelevisionCommission, 50 F.C.C.2d 461 (1975) (both cases involved overt racial discrimination
on the part of the stations).
When a challenger seeks the license of an incumbent broadcaster, the Commission
is supposed to compare the promises of the challenger with the record of the incum-
bent in a comparative renewal proceeding. However, in 1965, the Commission, rec-
ognizing that those seeking licenses made programming promises they could not
keep, decided that, except in unusual circumstances, it would not consider proposedprogramming by new applicants as a basis for preferring one applicant over another.
Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 397 n.9 (1965).
To save time, the Commission has developed its own standards by which it grants
"renewal expectancy" (virtually assuring renewal) to a broadcaster if during the pastlicense period it has broadcast some minimum amount of programming "responsive
to community needs and interests" and if they have not committed a serious viola-
tion of Commission rules. In the past, the Commission counted the quantity of news,
public affairs, and other informational programming in determining renewal expec-
tancy. In 1984, the Commission changed the standard from the absolute quantity of
informational and local programming, to the nature of programming that has been
responsive to the problems, needs, and interests of the community. A renewal ex-
pectancy is granted when a licensee demonstrates that it has "ascertained" in some
way important problems in the local community and has broadcast programs dealing
with the community's problems, needs, and interests. Revision of Programming &
Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements & Program Log Require-
ments for Commercial Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 1092. (1984), rev'd in
part sub nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987).See Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1432-
34 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Broadcasters are required to keep public files listing important
community issues and programs dealing with those issues. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3526(a)(8)(1987).
Under these standards, broadcasters usually enjoy automatic license renewal.
Once granted, renewal expectancy will outweigh positive attributes of a competing
applicant that the Commission considers important, including diversity of broadcast-
ing ownership, integration of ownership and management, and minority and female
ownership. See Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing Distress
Sales & Tax Certificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifica-
tions, 1 F.C.C. Rcd. 1315 (1986); West Michigan Broadcasting v. FCC, 735 F.2d 601(D.C. Cir. 1984); Leiby, The Female Merit Policy in Steele v. FCC: "A Whim Lead-
ing To A Better World?," 37 AM. U.L. REV. 379 (1988).
POST-FAIRNESS DOCTRINE ERA
refusing to revoke the licenses of even those broadcasters with
a poor record of public service.' Because revocation inflicts
such a huge penalty, it is virtually useless as an FCC tool to
force compliance with Commission rules and, therefore, must
be changed. 7
That the license renewal process does not work well is not,
however, an argument for granting broadcasting licenses in
perpetuity. On the contrary, failure to serve the public inter-
est, including serious Fairness Doctrine violations, should be
sufficient for license removal. 8 Forty years of experience
with the Fairness Doctrine, however, has raised the nagging
question of whether a license can be revoked for violating the
Doctrine without abridging the first amendment rights of
broadcasters. An examination of the cases where program
content resulted in serious FCC sanctions provides further evi-
dence that the Doctrine may be incompatible with traditional
first amendment values.
56. See infra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
57. Broadcasters find themselves in a difficult situation where first amendment
rights clash with their desire to keep their licenses. Program content is the key
element in renewal expectancy. If it is determined that the first amendment prohib-
its consideration of content, broadcasters may have a much weaker case when being
compared to a competing applicant who receives credit for integration (active partici-
pation in management of the station by the owners); diversity (those having signifi-
cant media holdings will not be considered as favorably as those without or with
fewer media holdings); and minority and female ownership. Broadcasters would lose
the tremendous advantage they currently enjoy by presenting a record of service to
the Commission. The courts, however, would not likely allow the Commission to
renew licenses merely on the basis that there was compliance with Commission
rules, without programming being an important factor. See Ashbacker Radio Corp.
v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945); Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
58. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia briefly held the view
that a licensee's programming should be "superior" and not just "substantial" in or-
der to win renewal expectancy. Central Florida Enterprises v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 56-
58 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 957 (1979). In an appeal from a second
Commission decision, the Court modified its opinion and held that "substantial" or
"meritorious" programming would be sufficient. Central Florida Enterprises v.
FCC, 683 F.2d 503, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1084 (1983). In Central
Florida the Court was concerned that an "incumbent television licensee has never
been denied renewal in a comparative challenge." Id. at 510 (emphasis in original).
The Commission has refused to adopt a quantitative standard for measuring merito-
rious performance. See National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 589 F.2d 578 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
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A. The Fairness Doctrine and License Revocation: Capital
Punishment in Broadcasting
A Philadelphia radio station has the dubious honor of being
the only licensee to lose its license largely for Fairness Doc-
trine violations. The controversy began on March 17, 1965,
when the FCC, over the objections of various religious and
civic organizations, approved the sale of WXUR-AM and
WXUR-FM in Media, Pennsylvania, to the Reverend Carl Mc-
Intire.59 The FCC granted McIntire a one-year license. When
he sought a routine three-year license renewal, the same orga-
nizations protested.6 0 This time, however, they cited specific
instances in McIntire's first year of broadcasting which indi-
cated that WXUR's programming was "one-sided, unbalanced,
and weighted on the extreme right radicalism. '6 1
Despite the protests and offensive nature of the programs
broadcast by the station, an FCC hearing examiner concluded
that religion in general, and conservative fundamentalist reli-
gion in particular, was underserved in the area62 and held that
WXUR should keep its license.6 3 The Commission criticized
and reversed the hearing examiner's opinion, and did not re-
59. Those groups included the National Council of Churches, the Urban League,
and others who denounced McIntire's history of "intemperate attacks on other reli-
gious denominations, various organizations, government agencies and political
figures." The groups claimed McIntire was using the airwaves to "help create a cli-
mate of fear, prejudice and distrust of democratic institutions.' Brandywine-Main
Line Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 18, at para. 1 (1970).
60. Id. at 18-19, para. 1, 55-58, paras. 48-58.
61. Among the more offensive programming was a nightly talk show hosted by
Tom Livezey, a man described as possessing "a special talent for attracting those
citizens of the City of Brotherly Love who stayed up late worrying about Jews,
blacks, radicals and Billy Graham." The following is a segment from Livezey's show:
Woman Listener: About this B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League... why
don't they get upset at all these smut and filth that's going through the
mails?
Livezey: And who do you think is behind all this obscenity that daily floods
our mails, my dear?
Listener: Well, frankly, Tom, I think it is the Jewish people.
Livezey: You bet your life it is.
On another occasion Livezey encouraged a listener to read a poem about his desire
to be a dog so that he could desecrate the graves of such people as Franklin D.
Roosevelt and Martin Luther King, Jr. See ic at 58-70, para. 65 (hearing examiner's
report on Livezey's program).
62. Id. at 103-04, paras. 212-15. He also noted that the "entire broadcasting for-
mat over the license period and since has been one which welcomed opposing view-
points." I&
63. Id, at 42, para. 2.
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new the license.64
On appeal, it was unclear to the court of appeals whether
the FCC's decision not to renew was based on Fairness Doc-
trine violations or on misrepresentations by the station as to
how the Fairness Doctrine obligations would be met.' Writ-
ing for the court, Judge Tamm, in Brandywine-Main Line Ra-
dio, Inc. v. FCC,' stated that WXUR's record was bleak in the
area of good faith, and that "at best, [its] record is indicative of
a lack of regard for fairness principles; at worst, it shows an
utter disdain for Commission rulings and ignores its own re-
sponsibilities as a broadcaster ....
The court was especially disturbed by WXUR's misrepresen-
tations to the Commission when it applied for the license,
about the station's programming plans,68 and by Brandywine's
response to criticism of "Interfaith Forum," a half-hour show
broadcast on Sunday that purported to make time available
"equally to all faiths. '69
The court of appeals, relying on the Supreme Court's deci-
64. Id at 34-35, paras. 38-39.
65. Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 61-62 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
66. Id. Brandywine-Main Line Radio was the licensee of WXUR.
67. Id at 46-47.
68. Within days of the license transfer, the operators of WXUR immediately re-
placed programs that were "predominantly entertainment oriented" with shows
characterized as "Hate Clubs of the Air." Id. at 51. The court added:
The speed with which these changes took place can lead the court to one
conclusion and one conclusion only-Brandywine intended to place these
controversial programs on the air from the first but feared to so inform the
Commission lest the transfer application be denied.... Brandywine sought
through subterfuge to gain its license and then proceed to broadcast the
type of material it believed to be most suitable-the type of material which
would forward the ends of the fundamentalist movement-in utter disre-
gard for either the public or their earlier representations to the
Commission.
Id.
69. Id. at 23. In its license application, Brandywine claimed that:
Every effort will be made to obtain varied participation from week to week
to assure the greatest possible balance of views on the subjects of discus-
sion.... The transferee will ... make sincere efforts to obtain participation
by individual churches and faiths in a manner which will assure ... fair and
equal representation of varying views.
Id After local criticism of the show's one-sided nature, Brandywine changed the
program, but in the court's opinion, the content remained "without resemblance to
those representations made to the Commission." Id. at 51. The court added: "This
was never an interfaith dialogue but rather an interview program of students and
faculty at the Faith Theological Seminary .... We fail to see how it complies with
Brandywine's representations for dialogue between the faiths." Id.
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sion in FCC v. WOKO Inc., 70 suggested that the fact that Bran-
dywine concealed information "may be more significant than
the facts concealed." Further, the court condemned Brandy-
wine's behavior during the license period:
These men, with their hearts bent toward deliberate and
premeditated deception, cannot be said to have dealt fairly
with the Commission or the people in the Philadelphia area.
Their statements constitute a series of heinous misrepresenta-
tions which, even without the other factors in this case, would
be ample justification for the Commission to refuse to renew
the broadcast license.7
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Red Lion,72 the
court found that the FCC's refusal to renew Brandywine's
license was consistent with the first amendment.73 Judge
Tamm noted that the law requires licensees to act as
fiduciaries:
Failure to live up to the trust placed in the hands of the fidu-
ciary requires that a more responsible trustee be found. This
is not the public's attempt to silence the trustee-it is the
trustee's attempt to silence the public. This is not the public
censoring the trustee-it is the trustee censoring the public.74
Initially, Chief Judge Bazelon concurred in the decision, but
"solely on the ground that the licensee deliberately withheld
information about its programming plans. 75  When Judge
Bazelon issued an opinion forty days later, he dissented, stat-
ing that removal of Brandywine's license was a "prima facie
violation of the First Amendment, 7 6  and suggested that
70. 329 U.S. 223, 227 (1946). The court of appeals quoted the Supreme Court's
opinion: "The willingness to deceive a regulatory body may be disclosed by immate-
rial and useless deceptions as well as by material and persuasive ones." Brandywine-
Main Line, 473 F.2d at 51.
71. Brandywine-Main Line, 473 F.2d at 52.
72. Id. at 45, 49, 56-59.
73. Id. at 60. The court added: "This is not a case in which the Commission is
acting on an isolated mistake or two, in the course of a three year license period.
This is a case of deliberate and continuing disregard in a short time period .... ." Id.
74. Id. at 60-61.
75. Id. at 63.
76. Id. Judge Bazelon stated:
The Federal Communications Commission has subjected Brandywine to the
supreme penalty: it may no longer operate as a radio broadcast station. In
silencing WXUR, the Commission has dealt a death blow to the licensee's
freedom of speech and press. Furthermore, it has denied the listening pub-
lic access to the expression of many controversial views. Yet, the Commis-
sion would have us approve this action in the name of the fairness doctrine,
the constitutional validity of which is premised on the argument that its
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merely because the airwaves belong to the public does not give
government the right to "place restraints upon the First
Amendment rights of those who use this property. '77 Judge
Bazelon asserted that the scarcity argument was obsolete 7
and described his original concurrence as resting on the "nar-
row ledge of Brandywine's misrepresentations under the
Supreme Court's ruling in FCC v. WOKO Inc."'70 But he added
that it is "abundantly clear that the Fairness Doctrine is the
'central aspect' of this case .... I have therefore concluded
that the great weight of First Amendment considerations can-
not rest on so narrow a ledge."'80
Provoked by Judge Bazelon's statements, Judge J. Skelly
Wright responded in a separate statement that "the court's
judgment in this case is not based on the Fairness Doctrine,"8 '
and insisted instead that his concurrence was based "solely on
the deception ground" and not on Fairness Doctrine viola-
tions.8 2 He reasoned that because Judge Tamm would affirm
on that rationale, "that ground, and that ground alone, forms
the basis of our judgment. '8 3
Judge Tamm had identified Brandywine's deception. But
what is largely missing from both the court's opinion and
Judge Bazelon's dissent is recognition of the fact that any ap-
plicant for a license will promise the FCC that it will abide by
provisions of the Fairness Doctrine and other rules when op-
erating the station. Without such a commitment, the license
would be awarded to another applicant. It is unclear, there-
fore, whether WXUR was punished for deceiving the Commis-
sion at the initial phase when it promised to fulfill its Fairness
enforcement will enhance public access to a marketplace of ideas without
serious infringement of the First Amendment rights of individual
broadcasters.
Id. (emphasis in original).
77. Id at 68.
78. Id. at 73-77.
79. 329 U.S. 223, 227 (1946).
80. Brandywine-Main Line, 473 F.2d at 80. Judge Bazelon added:
The point to be made is simply that I had originally thought that the alleged
misrepresentation could be considered separately from the other issues in
the case. But upon closer consideration, it became clear to me that the sub-
ject matter of the so-called "deception" is inextricably bound up in the con-
siderations underlying the fairness doctrine.
Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 81 (emphasis in original).
83. Id.
1989]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
Doctrine obligations or for actually violating the Doctrine. It
appears that the court relied on the misrepresentation ground,
but implicitly recognized that the Fairness Doctrine was vio-
lated (while explicitly avoiding the first amendment issues).
The court's position, however, does not change the fact that
an applicant who promises to abide by the Fairness Doctrine
cannot lose a license for "deception" unless it also violates the
Fairness Doctrine during the license period. Creating a dis-
tinction between misrepresentations and actual violations of
the Doctrine obscures the constitutional issues which a license
revocation under such circumstances invariably raises.
Although the court and the Commission condemned WXUR
for its misleading statements about its programming plans, the
station seemingly lost its license because of its failure to abide
by provisions of the Fairness Doctrine. An applicant who
promised to obey Fairness Doctrine obligations in one way, but
ended up fulfilling them in another, would not likely find it-
self the subject of severe FCC sanctions.
B. A Reluctant FCC: WLBT-TV and the Failure to Serve the
Public Interest
The Commission's imposition of the death penalty on
WXUR was an aberration. Broadcasters who actively and ef-
fectively lobby the Commission through various organizations
have convinced the FCC that license revocation is harmful to
the industry and not in the best interests of the public.84 This
has meant that even blatant violations of the Fairness Doc-
trine, such as those of WLBT-TV in Jackson, Mississippi, have
proved insufficient as grounds for license removal.
WLBT-TV had such a despicable record of public service
that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in
an unprecedented action, ordered the Commission to remove
the license and, in the process, sharply criticized the ability of
the FCC to regulate broadcasting in the public interest.8 5 The
case is one of the clearest examples of why broadcasters can-
not be granted unbridled discretion to do as they please with
their stations.
In the midst of this nation's civil rights movement, the own-
84. See Dyk, supra note 18, at 305-08, 314-16; Fowler & Brenner, supra note 5, at
209 n.10.
85. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d
543 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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ers of WLBT-TV did all they could to preserve a segregated
society.8 The station's record was clear: over a period of
nearly a decade, since 1955, it had consistently broadcast anti-
integration and anti-black programs and remarks and had re-
fused to allow spokesmen to challenge those comments. De-
spite the fact that blacks constituted forty-five percent of the
viewing audience, there were apparently only two occasions on
which blacks had ever been allowed on any Mississippi televi-
sion station.
Two local civil rights leaders, Dr. Aaron Henry and Robert
Smith, both associated with the United Church of Christ, peti-
tioned the FCC to deny WLBT's license renewal for violation
of the Fairness Doctrine. The petitioners argued that by fail-
ing to provide for appearances by blacks while presenting con-
troversial issues of public importance, WLBT had crossed the
line drawn by Congress when it enacted the Fairness
Doctrine."8
The FCC ruled that Henry, Smith, and the United Church
of Christ lacked standing to bring the action. 9 The Commis-
sion, however, decided that it should further investigate
WLBT's broadcast policies.90 In the interim, and without hold-
ing any hearings to resolve the issues, the Commission granted
WLBT a one-year renewal,9 finding that the Jackson area was
86. The station broadcast announcements urging resistance to integration be-
cause "Communists were behind" the effort. F. FRIENDLY, supra note 12, at 90. The
station swore that James Meredith would never be admitted to the University of
Mississippi; whenever a black was featured on a network program, WLBT-TV would
interrupt with a slide that said, "Sorry, Cable Trouble." Id. See Office of Communi-
cation of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The
station also refused to sell time to groups seeking to respond to WLBT's position on
integration. Id.
87. F. FRIENDLY, supra note 12, at 92.
88. The U.S. Court of Appeals recognized that the intervenors were petitioning
for nonrenewal of the license on Fairness Doctrine grounds and more general
grounds of failure to serve the public interest. Office of Communication, 359 F.2d at
998-99. It is interesting to note that the court of appeals concluded that Congress
had codified the Fairness Doctrine in the 1959 amendments: "This policy [the Fair-
ness Doctrine] received Congressional approval in the 1959 amendment of Section
315 .... ." Id at 999 n.5.
89. To establish standing, Dr. Aaron Henry and Robert Smith alleged that they
represented individuals and organizations that were denied a reasonable opportunity
to be heard. Id. at 998-99. The Church eventually spent more than $240,000 in legal
expenses.
90. Id at 999-1000.
91. The FCC had granted the station a three-year license renewal in 1958. Id at
998. The court described the FCC's reason for denial of standing:
The ... denial ... was based on the theory that, absent a potential direct,
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
entering a critical period in race relations and that the station
could make a contribution to resolving problems related to
those issues.92
The United Church of Christ and Reverend Everett Parker,
a minister of the church in New York City, appealed the Com-
mission's decision on standing, precipitating a six-year battle
and demonstrating the difficulty of removing an incumbent
broadcaster's license, even in the face of overwhelming evi-
dence that the licensee had violated Commission rules and
failed to serve the public interest.
Eventually, the D.C. Circuit court held that the grant of re-
newal of WLBT's license for one year was erroneous and di-
rected the Commission to conduct hearings on the renewal
application. The court said the Commission must allow appel-
lants, as responsible representatives of the listening public, to
intervene.93
Judge Warren Burger wrote a unanimous opinion criticizing
the FCC's decision to deny standing to spokesmen for televi-
sion viewers. He found "no reason to exclude those with such
an obvious and acute concern as the listening audience. This
much seems essential to insure that the holders of broadcast-
ing licenses be responsive to the needs of the audience, with-
out which the broadcaster could not exist. ' 94 He added that
"after nearly five decades of operation, the broadcast industry
does not seem to have grasped the simple fact that a broadcast
substantial injury or adverse effect from the administrative action under
consideration, a petitioner has no standing before the Commission and that
the only types of effects sufficient to support standing are economic injury
and electrical interference. It asserted its traditional position that members
of the listening public do not suffer any injury peculiar to them and that
allowing them standing would pose great administrative burdens.
Id. at 1000.
92. Id. The Commission stated that "[a] contribution is needed now--and should
not be put off for the future. We believe that the licensee, operating in strict accord-
ance with the representations made and other conditions specified herein, can make
that needed contribution, and thus that its renewal would be in the public interest."
Id. at 1007 n.27.
93. Id. at 1009.
94. Id. at 1002. The opinion of the court on the issue of standing had significance
far beyond the WLBT case. It opened the door to a new era in which public groups
could have standing to petition the FCC. See E. KRASNOW, L. LONGLEY & H. TERRY,
THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 54-62 (1982).
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license is a public trust subject to termination for breach of
duty."9
It took the FCC more than two years to determine whether
WLBT should continue to hold the license, during which time
WLBT began to improve its record.' On June 27, 1968, decid-
ing the case on remand, the Commission renewed WLBT's li-
cense for a full term of three years,97 convinced of the station's
good faith effort to improve coverage of the black community.
The Commission ruled that Smith, Henry, and the United
Church of Christ had failed to meet the burden of proof that
the alleged violations occurred, and noted that recent "marked
improvements" in the station's programming helped justify
renewal.98
When the court of appeals reviewed the FCC action for the
second time, it suggested that the Commission had intention-
ally ignored instructions of the court to treat the representa-
tives of the audience fairly.99 Judge Burger expressed anger
because the FCC had shown such hostility toward the efforts
of the public intervenors who were required to satisfy "a sur-
95. 359 F.2d at 1003. The court quoted at length from a 1963 congressional report
on broadcasting:
Under our system, the interests of the public are dominant. The commer-
cial needs of licensed broadcasters and advertisers must be integrated into
those of the public. Hence, individual citizens and the communities they
compose owe a duty to themselves and their peers to take an active interest
in the scope and quality of the television service which stations and net-
works provide and which, undoubtedly, has a vast impact on their lives and
the lives of their children. Nor need the public feel that in taking a hand in
broadcasting they are unduly interfering in the private affairs of others. On
the contrary, their interest in television programming is direct and their
responsibilities important. They are the owners of the channels of televi-
sion-indeed, of all broadcasting.
Id. (quoting FCC, Television Network Program Procurement, H.R. REP. No. 281,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1963)) (emphasis added by court of appeals).
96. See F. FRIENDLY, supra note 12, at 99.
97. As five of the seven commissioners explained:
We caution . . .against any conclusion that WLBT's performance . . .was
spotless, or a model of perfection to be emulated by other stations .... We
only conclude that the intervenors have failed to prove their charges and
that the preponderance of evidence before us establishes that station WLBT
has afforded reasonable opportunity for the use of its facilities by the signif-
icant groups comprising its service area.
In re Application of Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 14 F.C.C.2d 431, para. 22 (1968).
98. Id. at paras. 20-21.
99. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
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prisingly strict standard of proof."100  The court added that
"the Commission exhibited at best a reluctant tolerance of this
court's mandate and at worst a profound hostility to the par-
ticipation of the Public Intervenors and their efforts." 10'
Judge Burger denied the Commission another opportunity
to implement the court's holding in the case, concluding that
no useful purpose would be served by asking the Commission
to reconsider its decision under a correct allocation of the bur-
den of proof.102 In June 1971, sixteen years after the station's
poor record of public service first came to the attention of the
FCC, the license of Lamar Life Broadcasting to broadcast over
station WLBT was revoked. 0 3 While its overall record of pub-
lic service was the most significant issue in the denial of li-
cense renewal, 04 the failure to fulfill Fairness Doctrine
obligations was a key factor in the court's decision.0 5
C. The "Pensions" Case: The Danger of the Fairness Doctrine
Those favoring elimination of all content regulations, espe-
cially the Fairness Doctrine, can point to the FCC's action in a
case involving an NBC documentary as the most indefensible
application of the Fairness Doctrine in the Commission's his-
tory. While the FCC demonstrated a rare willingness to rule
against an important broadcaster, the case illustrates the po-
tential danger posed by the Fairness Doctrine. It also demon-
strates how part one of the Fairness Doctrine can be used as a
100. Id. at 550.
101. Id. at 549-50.
102. Id, Burger concluded: "The administrative conduct reflected in this record is
beyond repair." Id. at 550. In describing the Commission's treatment of the inter-
venors as "interlopers," the Court likened a public intervenor who is seeking no
license or private right to "a complaining witness who presents evidence to police or
a prosecutor whose duty it is to conduct an affirmative and objective investigation of
all the facts." Id. at 546.
103. Interestingly, when the Commission invited applications for WLBT following
the court's opinion, it allowed Lamar Life Broadcasting to be one of the applicants,
which had been suggested by the court: "We do refrain, however, from holding that
the licensee be declared disqualified from filing a new application." Id. at 550. In
denying a petition of the FCC for the court to hear the case en banc, Judges Mc-
Gowan and Tamm wrote that the "ineptitude of the Commission was as much, if not
more, to blame for this scandalous delay than was the licensee. For this reason [the
court] was not disposed to declare the licensee ineligible to seek new authority to use
the channel." Id. at 551.
104. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994, 997-1000 (D.C. Cir. 1966); 425 F.2d 543, 547-49 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
105. 359 F.2d at 998; 425 F.2d at 545.
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shield by broadcasters'to avoid the responsibility to cover con-
troversial issues.
On September 12, 1972, the NBC Television Network broad-
cast Pensions: The Broken Promise. 10 6 The program dealt with
abuses in the private pension system and concluded that pay-
ing into a pension plan for years was no guarantee that an in-
dividual would receive benefits. The broadcast included
interviews with aging workers who described firsthand exper-
iences with pension plan abuse.107 While there were inter-
views with some individuals who made positive statements
about private pension plans, a majority of the hour was de-
voted to the critical comments of those for whom the system
had failed.10 8 NBC claimed it had been unsuccessful in its at-
tempts to interview more individuals who would praise pen-
sion plans.1 9
On November 27, 1972, Accuracy in Media (AIM), a media
watchdog group, filed a complaint with the FCC charging
NBC with presenting a one-sided picture of private pension
plans."10 The group argued that the network violated the Fair-
ness Doctrine by failing to provide a reasonable opportunity
for the presentation of contrasting views."' AIM demanded
that NBC grant it reply time to counter the negative impres-
sion of pension plans left by the documentary."12
106. For a transcript of the documentary, see NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1135-46
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
107. Id. Some individuals lost their pensions when their employer went out of
business. Others lost pensions when they changed union locals and did not spend
enough time in the second local to qualify for the pension program. In all the cases
described in the program, the worker had expected the pension plan to pay benefits
at retirement.
108. Id.
109. Narrator Edwin Newman summed up the documentary's findings: "This has
been a depressing program to work on, but we don't want to give the impression that
there are no good private pension plans. There are many good ones, and there are
many people for whom the promise has become reality. That should be said." Id at
1146. Newman then urged individuals enrolled in private pension plans to take a
close look at their own situation, and he ended the documentary by saying:
Our own conclusion about all of this is that it is almost inconceivable that
this enormous thing has been allowed to grow up with so little understand-
ing of it and with so 'little protection and such uneven results for those in-
volved. The situation, as we've seen it, is deplorable.
Id See also F. FRIENDLY, supra note 12, at 142-66.
110. In Re Complaint of Accuracy in Media Against National Broadcasting Co., 44
F.C.C.2d 1027, para. 2 (1973).
111. Id at paras. 10-13.
112. The documentary won both an American Bar Association Award and the
George Foster Peabody Award. Some consider the Peabody award to be "broadcast-
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In a 5-2 decision, the FCC agreed that the network had vio-
lated the Fairness Doctrine. 113 Applying the Doctrine to a net-
work documentary for the first time, the Commission, while
commending NBC for a "laudable journalistic effort,"'1 4 nev-
ertheless ordered the network to "submit a statement within
twenty days indicating how it intended to fulfill its Fairness
Doctrine obligations."1
NBC appealed the Commission's decision.11 6  In NBC v.
FCC,"'7 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
determined that the Commission's action constituted unconsti-
tutional censorship."' NBC claimed its attempt to find indi-
viduals who would make positive comments about pension
plans had been mostly unsuccessful.'19 NBC maintained that
not every issue had exactly proportional opposing views and
that the essence of journalism was editorial decision-making
concerning the program's content.120
ing's Pulitzer" and the industry's most prestigious award. Ironically, on the same
day that NBC was awarded the Peabody, the FCC staff decided the network had
violated the Fairness Doctrine. See NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1147-51 (D.C. Cir.
1974) for reviews of the program by TV critics.
113. Accuracy, 44 F.C.C.2d at paras. 19-28.
114. NBC, 516 F.2d at 1109.
115. Accuracy, 44 F.C.C.2d at para. 28. On January 23, 1974, the Commission de-
nied NBC's request for a stay of its decision pending judicial review. I. at para. 7.
116. NBC argued that "compulsive government programming against the will of
the licensee prior to judicial review cannot be undone by an after-the-fact reversal of
the Commission's decision in this case." F. FRIENDLY, supra note 12, at 154.
117. 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
118. Id. at 1108-09, 1120-22, 1125-26.
119. Id. at 1132-33. This contrasted with Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969), where a Pennsylvania radio station that broadcast a personal attack
on an author refused to provide reply time, asserting that it had no obligation to do
SO.
120. Reuven Frank, then President of NBC News, explained:
The "Pensions" program was put together by a group of reporters and edi-
tors who had no stake in how it came out, except to tell people more than
they might already know about something of interest to them .... The re-
ply, if there were to be one, would necessarily be by someone who had a
position to promote, one identifiable in advance. Then his credentials would
be presented as journalistically equal to those of the reporters and editors
who did the program ....
Frank, A Fairness Doctrine for Journalists?, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1975, at 21, col. 3.
Frank distinguished journalism from discussion:
Journalism is a recognizable sort of activity, certainly to other journalists.
So long as it is confused with discussion, we're going to have a rhetorical
muddle.... The "Pensions" program was not a discussion; it was a job of
reporting. Having it subject to reply as though it were one side of a discus-
sion damages journalism. Debating is not the journalist's job; reporting is.
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After an expedited hearing, the court agreed with NBC that
the Commission had exceeded its authority and misapplied the
Fairness Doctrine. 2 ' The court held that NBC's failure to
provide reasonable opportunity for the presentation of con-
trasting views remained unproven.'22 The court, noting that
the Fairness Doctrine is "an instance of a necessary control in
the public interest,' 123 nevertheless found that investigative
reporting, like that in the Pensions broadcast, often uncovers
"presumed evils in society," and that requiring a balancing in
such broadcasts would negate the value of such reporting.
2 4
The court concluded that the FCC needed to restrain itself in
such cases. 25
On December 13, 1974, the court granted an en banc re-
view. 26  However, in a strange twist, two weeks before the
case was to be heard, the circuit reversed itself and decided
not to hear the case.2 7 Apparently, the FCC, unhappy with
the Pensions case as a test of the Fairness Doctrine, 28 con-
vinced enough members of the court that Congress' passage of
the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
121. NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1132-34 (D.C. Cir. 1974). During oral argument,
Judge Leventhal expressed concern about allegations from NBC's attorney, Floyd
Abrams, that no one at the FCC had ever actually seen the program and that the
Commission's decision was based entirely on a written transcript. F. FRIENDLY,
supra note 12, at 154.
122. NBC, 516 F.2d at 1133.
123. Id at 1132. The court continued:
The broadcaster cannot assert a right of freedom of [the] press that tran-
scends the public's right to know. But application of the [fairness] doctrine
must still recognize the enduring values of wide latitude of journalistic dis-
cretion in the licensee. And when a court is called on to take a "hard look"
whether the Commission has gone too far and encroached on journalistic
discretion, it must take a hard look to avoid enforcing judicial predilections.
124. For example, in a broadcast story about corrupt policemen, "[i]f an
equivalent weight or time must be given to policemen who are not on the 'take,' the
whole campaign becomes so unwieldy and pointless as to be useless." Id at 1124.
The court included comments from veteran correspondent David Brinkley about a
program he narrated on highway construction: "I did not think at that time that I
was obliged to recite (or find someone to recite) that not all highway construction
involves corruption, that many highways are built by honorable men, or the like."
Id at 1124 n.76.
125. Id. at 1123-24.
126. Id. The en banc court sustained Judge Leventhal's order staying the Com-
mission's order until the en banc judgment was rendered.
127. Id. at 1156.
128. F. FRIENDLY, supra note 12, at 162-63.
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correcting abuses revealed in the NBC documentary, rendered
the case moot.' 9
When the en banc heating was vacated, the case was re-
manded to the original panel for a ruling on the mootness
question. The panel, in a 2-1 decision, remanded the case to
the Commission, which agreed to drop all proceedings. 130
129. NBC, 516 F.2d at 1180-1201.
130. Judge Leventhal wrote:
The Commission seeks remand on the theory of mootness. It is clear, how-
ever, that this theory is simply the medium advanced by the Commission to
enable the case to be ended without a definitive decision on the merits. The
essence of the matter is that the Commission seeks permission to vacate its
order.
Id. at 1182.
Judge Bazelon, who had been anxious for the en banc arguments to proceed so the
court could squarely decide the issue of the constitutionality of the Doctrine, wrote a
blistering attack against the eight judges who had vacated the en banc hearing. He
was especially incensed over the NBC argument, largely accepted by the court, that
the documentary did not involve a controversial issue of public importance. The
court had attempted to draw a distinction between subjects that were merely "news-
worthy," and those that were "controversial issues of public importance," based on
NBC's argument that the program exposed individual cases of pension plan abuse
without enlarging the issue to include criticism of the pension plan system. The
court accepted NBC's assertion that, because it was well known that there were bad
private pension plans, the documentary did not identify a controversial issue:
The point is fundamental. In a case where NBC has made a reasonable
judgment that a program relates to, and the public has an interest in know-
ing about, the "broken promise" abuses that its reporters have identified in
various private pension plans, and there is no controversy concerning the
existence in fact of abuses, then the balancing of the fairness doctrine can-
not permit the intrusion of a government agency to make its own determi-
nation of the subject and thrust of the program as a report that such abuses
feature private pensions generally, and with such enlargement to a contro-
versial status to burden the reporting with the obligation of providing an
opposing view of the escalated controversy.
Id. at 1125. NBC also claimed, and the court accepted, that because the program did
not advocate specific legislative remedies, it was not controversial: "There are con-
troversies as to specific proposals, but they were not the subject of the Pensions
broadcast." Id. at 1133.
Judge Bazelon denounced the court's acceptance of NBC's position that the docu-
mentary did not involve a controversial issue of public importance. He wrote:
I wonder what the professional journalists who prepared the "Pensions"
program think about NBC's litigation position in this case that their pro-
gram was not really controversial. My own thought is that NBC has by its
litigation position done more to attack and undercut the "Pensions" pro-
gram than anything AIM could have done through the FCC. This is the
saddest commentary of all.
Id. at 1179.
In essence, Judge Bazelon feared that the court's decision would
lead to the manipulation of programming in a manner designed to avoid the
Fairness Doctrine through contortions in the subject matter of the program.
If this occurs, we would be faced with the ironic consequences of the court's
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What could have been an important constitutional test of
the Fairness Doctrine fizzled out when the court, reaching the
first amendment issues, merely accepted NBC's assertion that
the program was not controversial. 131  Broadcasters won a
moral victory because the court determined that the FCC ac-
tion constituted impermissible censorship.
1 3 2
Because NBC never complied with the FCC request to pro-
vide information on how it would balance the documentary, it
is difficult to assess the problems that would be associated
with a "reply" documentary or some other forum for balanc-
ing the Pensions broadcast. The Commission offered NBC
wide discretion to correct imbalances in the original
documentary. 13
3
The splintered opinions of the D.C. bench show how ill-
equipped and hesitant even the court of appeals is to deal with
the constitutional issues surrounding the Fairness Doctrine.
The Commission's eventual decision to abolish the Doctrine
action having a greater chilling effect on broadcasters than a forthright,
open application of the Fairness Doctrine. The court will have granted the
broadcaster the right to make non-controversial speech and in the name of
the First Amendment, broadcasters may seek to embrace this "right." I
seem to recall that it is controverisal speech and not the right to assert that
one's speech is not really controversial which should be protected.
131. Id at 1125.
132. NBC's victory was not without cost. It spent well over $100,000 in legal ex-
penses and thousands of hours in personnel time fighting the Fairness complaint. S.
SIMMONS, supra note 47, at 217. See 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 7, at para. 36.
133. The Commission ruled that:
neither the staff's ruling nor our affirmance of its decision holds that NBC
must now produce and broadcast another one-hour documentary "dealing
with happy pensioners" or portraying the pension system as "a success." As
we have stated, NBC's obligation is to afford a reasonable opportunity in its
overall programming for the public to be informed as to the views of groups
or individual spokesmen opposed to the viewpoint that the private pension
system has performed poorly .... Just as NBC was not required to present
those views in its "Pensions" documentary, it is not now required to present
them in any particular program or format. There is no requirement that
any precisely equal balance of views be achieved, and all matters concerning
the particular opposing views to be presented.., are left to NBC's discre-
tion subject only to a standard of reasonableness and good faith.
Accuracy, 44 F.C.C.2d 1027, paras. 23-24 (1973) (emphasis in original).
Charles Ferris, FCC Chairman from 1977 to 1981, argues that the Fairness Doc-
trine asks nothing more than good journalism: "These responsibilities, which critics
of the fairness rules claim to be so onerous, are no greater than those required by
journalistic ethics and sound journalistic practice." Ferris & Kirkland, supra note
49, at 613.
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was predictable, given the inability of the courts to formulate
workable rules for its enforcement.
D. Part One of the Fairness Doctrine: The Neglected
Responsibility
Much of the litigation and controversy surrounding the
Fairness Doctrine centered on part two of the Doctrine, which
required balanced presentations of controversial issues.
Throughout the Doctrine's development, the FCC repeatedly
stated that a broadcaster's public service responsibilities under
part one included an affirmative obligation to cover controver-
sial issues in its community.' 34 The first prong of the Doctrine
was rooted in the Radio Act of 1927, relating to broadcasters'
duty to serve the public interest, and was more clearly stated
in the Commission's opinions in In re United Broadcasting Co.
in 1945,5 and In the Matter of Editorializing by Broadcast
Licensees in 1949.1
Despite its long history, the FCC virtually ignored part one
of the Fairness Doctrine. Only one case based on the Doc-
trine's first requirement, Patsy Mink v. WHAR, 137 was decided
against a broadcaster. In this case, a West Virginia radio sta-
tion refused to air an eleven-minute commentary by Congress-
woman Patsy Mink on the environmental effects of strip-
mining. 138 The petitioners stated that during a four-month pe-
134. Localism is an essential element in the public trustee model. Broadcasters
may not fulfill their Fairness Doctrine obligations merely by airing network pro-
grams of a controversial nature, but must identify issues of local importance and air
programs dealing with those issues. For many years the FCC required broadcasters
to follow relatively complicated ascertainment procedures which required surveying
community leaders and determining which ten issues were the most important to
that community. See In re Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems, 27
F.C.C.2d 650 (1971). Ascertainment was not directly linked to the Fairness Doctrine,
but the procedure would help broadcasters identify controversial issues. The Com-
mission terminated ascertainment requirements for radio in 1981, In re Deregulation
of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, para. 9 (1981), and for television in 1984, Revision of Pro-
gramming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Pro-
gram Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 49 Fed. Reg. 33,588
(1984).
135. 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945).
136. 13 F.C.C. 1246, para. 6 (1949).
137. 59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976).
138. As a sponsor of anti-strip-mining legislation, Congresswoman Mink wrote to
radio station WHAR and numerous other stations requesting that they broadcast a
tape she claimed contrasted viewpoints presented during a pro-strip-mining U.S.
Chamber of Commerce program that had previously been broadcast by "hundreds of
stations... including WHAR." Id at para. 2.
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riod when Congress was considering strip-mining legislation,
the radio station failed to air any programming on the existing
controversy.13 9 The petitioners further argued that the issue
was "of extreme importance to the economy and environment
of the area" served by the radio station, and thus constituted
an issue of public importance under part one of the Fairness
Doctrine. 4 °
The station argued that its subscription to the Associated
Press and the ABC Radio Network, both of which had broad-
cast stories about strip-mining, constituted sufficient coverage
to satisfy the Fairness Doctrine requirement. 4' The station
further suggested that, even if it had failed to "adequately
cover the strip-mining controversy, it doubted whether the li-
censee is answerable to the Commission for selection of those
issues to be broadcast, and therefore whether it would be
proper for the Commission to take any action in view of such
apparent failure."'42
Concluding that strip-mining was a matter of extreme im-
portance, the Commission found that the station's failure to
cover the issue was a violation of the Fairness Doctrine.
43
The FCC then reminded broadcasters "that it regards strict
adherence to the Fairness Doctrine-including the affirmative
obligation to provide coverage of issues of public importance-
as the single most important requirement of operation in the
public interest.' 44 The Commission ruled that the radio sta-
tion's actions were unreasonable, and requested that the licen-
see inform the Commission within twenty days as to how it
intended to meet its statutory obligations. 45
Although the Commission scolded the radio station for fail-
ing to meet its obligations under part one of the Doctrine, it
stated that it would not frequently punish broadcasters for
failure to air programs dealing with controversial issues. 46
139. The petition was filed by Media Access Project on behalf of Congresswoman
Mink, the Environmental Policy Center, and a citizen of Clarksburg. Id. at para. 1.
140. Id at para. 3 (quoting the complainants).
141. The station provided a list of stories about strip-mining from the AP and
ABC, but the FCC rejected the evidence on the grounds that the radio station was
not certain the news items were aired by the station. Id. at paras. 26, 28.
142. Id. at para. 8 (quoting WHAR's argument).
143. I& at para. 30.
144. I& at para. 19 (citing Complaint of Comm. for the Fair Broadcasting of Con-
troversial Issues v. CBS, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 25 F.C.C.2d 283 (1970)).
145. Mink, 59 F.C.C.2d 987, para. 30.
146. In a concurring opinion, Commissioner Glen 0. Robinson noted that the FCC
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When the FCC ceased enforcing the Fairness Doctrine in Au-
gust of 1987, it eliminated not only the more controversial and
heavily litigated part two, but also the non-threatening part
one obligation as well. The repeal of the Fairness Doctrine
means that a broadcaster's record in identifying and airing
programs related to important local issues will be judged by
the vague public interest standard, rather than the more spe-
cific part one requirement of the Fairness Doctrine. Under
such circumstances, it is unlikely that a broadcaster's failure
to cover such issues would be so obvious that it would come to
the attention of the Commission and result in sanctions.147
Broadcasters who commit insufficient resources to news and
public affairs programming fear neither punishment under the
now defunct part one requirement, nor retribution by a public
expected to effectively communicate its feelings merely
used the term "critical issues" to describe strip-mining and its relationship to the
community served by the station. He concluded that this usage meant that "not
every issue of public importance or controversy whose presentation might trigger an
obligation under part two of the Fairness Doctrine is sufficient to create an affirma-
tive obligation for coverage by the station under part one." Id at 998. Recognizing
that this was the first time the FCC had ever found that a "particular issue of public
controversy was so important that a licensee was compelled, under the first part of
the fairness doctrine, to offer at least some programming addressing it," i&i, Robin-
son suggested that such action constituted a "somewhat greater degree of govern-
ment interference than enforcement of the second [part of the fairness doctrine]
inasmuch as it is not triggered by the licensee's program choice." Id. He noted that
the Commission was "compelling a licensee to carry some program which it has cho-
sen not to air," and that such action seemed to be a part of requiring a licensee to
present balanced coverage. Id He also expressed concern that the Commission
would now find itself "involved more deeply in program judgments than it presently
desires or even foresees." Id at para. 30. He added: "If and when that happens,
present distress about the fairness doctrine will almost certainly become . . . more
widespread-perhaps even to the point where the courts, if not Congress, direct the
abolition of this mischievous doctrine." Id.
147. The marketplace theory of deregulation suggests that the part one require-
ment is unnecessary. The argument is that broadcasters, to attract and maintain an
audience for its news and public affairs programs, will identify controversial issues
and air programs about them without any encouragement from the Fairness Doc-
trine or the FCC. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 5. Although outside the scope
of this Article, the marketplace theory is beset with problems. For example, if a
station refused to air programs dealing with controversial issues, as was "required"
by part one of the Fairness Doctrine, it would be very difficult for the audience to
know enough about the day's events to realize what is missing. The marketplace
theory also assumes that by exercising its options to watch one program over an-
other, the audience will influence not only programming decisions, but also regula-
tory decisions such as who should own broadcasting stations, how long a broadcaster
must own a station before selling it, and other regulatory policy decisions that those
proposing deregulation of the industry believe the public is capable of making or
influencing merely by switching channels and writing letters.
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through its program choices.148  Because of these problems,
any new solution needs to ensure adequate presentation of im-
portant issues.
III
From Constitutional to Unconstitutional: The
Demise of the Fairness Doctrine
The FCC's decision to abolish the Fairness Doctrine fol-
lowed years of reports, public hearings, and seemingly endless
discussion of the Doctrine's constitutionality and effective-
ness.' 49  For many years, the Commission accepted two
precepts that severely limited its ability to modify or abolish
the Doctrine: first, that the Fairness Doctrine was constitu-
tional and thus could not be abolished on first amendment
grounds;150 and second, that since Congress codified the Doc-
trine in a 1959 amendment to the Communications Act of
1934, only Congress could repeal it.' 5 ' Whatever misgivings
the FCC had about the constitutional and policy issues, it
made no overt effort to eliminate the Doctrine until several
court decisions provided the opportunity. 5
A. The Supreme Court Upholds the Content Regulations
In its most important pronouncement on broadcast, regula-
148. This Article's recognition that the Fairness Doctrine was largely unworkable
does not decrease the importance of requiring that broadcasters use their frequency
to inform listeners and viewers about important public issues. See R. LABUNSKI, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT UNDER SIEGE: THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 131-34
(1981).
149. See Bolton, supra note 3, for a discussion of the numerous FCC inquiries into
the Fairness Doctrine. Broadcasting magazine is a useful resource for tracing com-
ments about the Doctrine within the industry, government, and public interest
groups.
150. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); see also 1987 Syra-
cuse, supra note 10, at paras. 37-61.
151. 1987 Syracuse, supra note 10, at para. 6; see also Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 379-86.
152. Several bills were introduced in Congress to repeal the Fairness Doctrine
prior to its elimination by the FCC: the First Amendment Clarification Act of 1987,
S. 22, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 247 (1987) (introduced by Senator
Proxmire, the Act would have repealed the Commission's authority to apply the
Fairness Doctrine); the Freedom of Expression Act, S. 827, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133
CONG. REC. 3741 (1987) (sponsored by Senator Packwood, the Act would have ex-
tended first amendment guarantees of free speech and free press to the electronic
media); see also H.R. 5585, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 105 CONG. REC. 3741 (1982) (state-
ment of Senator Packwood introducing S. 827 to repeal the Fairness Doctrine).
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tion, s the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
personal attack component 54 of the Fairness Doctrine in Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.' The Court's approval of the
Fairness Doctrine as necessary to regulate a scarce resource
proved a formidable barrier for deregulation proponents to
overcome. For almost twenty years, the Doctrine stood for the
principle that broadcasters are not entitled to the same first
amendment rights as the print media.
When radio station WGCB in Red Lion, Pennsylvania,
played a tape of Reverend Billy James Hargis delivering a
stinging personal attack against Fred J. Cook, an investigative
reporter and the author of a book on Barry Goldwater, the
seed for the Red Lion decision was planted.5 6 Shortly after
Cook complained to the FCC, the Commission ordered the ra-
dio station's owner, Reverend John Norris, to comply with the
personal attack rules by providing reply time to Cook."5 7 Nor-
ris refused to comply and appealed the decision. 58
Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court,1 5 9 Justice White
declared that the Fairness Doctrine and other content regula-
tions "enhance rather than abridge" freedom of speech and
press. 160 He also determined that the 1959 amendment effec-
tively included the Fairness Doctrine in the "public interest"
153. Red Lion was the only case considered by the Supreme Court that compre-
hensively examined the Fairness Doctrine's relationship to the first amendment, and
has been widely cited as justification for content regulation of the broadcasting
industry.
154. See supra note 6.
155. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
156. The book was entitled Goldwater: Extremist on the Right. Hargis called
Cook a "professional mudslinger," and accused him of dishonesty, of falsifying sto-
ries, and of defending Alger Hiss. F. FRIENDLY, supra note 12, at 5.
157. 1 F.C.C.2d 934 (1965); 395 U.S. at 372.
158. See F. FRIENDLY, supra note 12, at 46. The National Association of Broad-
casters (NAB) and other groups did not think that Red Lion made a good case in
which to test the constitutionality of the content regulations. On July 27, 1967, the
NAB, along with the Radio-Television News Directors Association (RTNDA), filed a
separate action challenging the Fairness Doctrine in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit in Chicago. On the same day, CBS filed its challenge to the
Fairness Doctrine in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York.
NBC filed a similar suit a few days later. Those suits were consolidated and the
Seventh Circuit, where the first suit was filed, was awarded jurisdiction. Thus, the
Supreme Court in Red Lion considered two cases: Red Lion and RTNDA-NBC-CBS.
The U.S. Court of Appeals in Red Lion was affirmed, while the Seventh Circuit in
RTNDA-NBC-CBS was reversed and remanded. See F. FRIENDLY, supra note 12, at
53-59.
159. Justice Douglas did not participate in the 8-0 decision.
160. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 375.
[Vol. 11:219
1989] POST-FAIRNESS DOCTRINE ERA
standard established in the Communications Act.161
The Court dismissed the argument that broadcasting and
print should be treated the same way: "Where there are sub-
stantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there
are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable
First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right
of every individual to speak, write or publish."'" 2 The Court
recognized that the first amendment was not irrelevant to
broadcasting, but determined that broadcasters must allow
their facilities to be used by those denied a license, based on a
scarcity rationale. 63
Justice White dismissed concerns that the Fairness Doctrine
and personal attack rules induced self-censorship as specula-
tive, ' stating that the Fairness Doctrine in the past had no
such effect.'65 He noted that if experience indicates that the
Doctrine has the "net effect of reducing rather than enhancing
161. Id at 380. Justice White also stated:
The history of the emergence of the fairness doctrine and of the related
legislation shows that the Commission's action in the Red Lion case did not
exceed its authority, and that in adopting the new regulations the Commis-
sion was implementing congressional policy rather than embarking on a
frolic of its own.
Id at 375.
162. Id. at 388.
163. Id, at 390-92. The Court stated:
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to
put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be ex-
pressed on this unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their in-
terest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium
function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment.
It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount.
Id. at 390. The notion that the first amendment protects the right of the listener or
viewer to receive information, as well as the right of the broadcaster to air it, is
extremely controversial. In Red Lion, Justice White wrote: "It is the right of the
public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas
and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be
abridged by Congress or by the FCC." Id Krattenmaker and Powe criticized this
aspect of Red Lion by writing: "No principle could be more at odds with the bulk of
first amendment jurisprudence." Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 4, at 155. The
Court has applied this principle in "commercial speech" cases. See Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
164. 395 U.S. at 392-93.
165. Justice White added:
[The rules] assert that under specified circumstances, a licensee must offer
to make available a reasonable amount of broadcast time to those who have
a view different from that which has already been expressed on his sta-
tion .... The First Amendment confers no right on licensees to prevent
others from broadcasting on "their" frequencies and no right to an uncondi-
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the volume and quality of coverage, there will be time enough
to reconsider the constitutional implications."'66
Linking the Fairness Doctrine and other content regulations
to the public interest standard was significant. While the
Court seemed to accept that Congress had given statutory ap-
proval to the Doctrine in 1959,167 it did not stop there. It spe-
cifically held that the obligations imposed by the Doctrine
were part of the public interest standard:
This language makes it very plain that Congress, in 1959, an-
nounced that the phrase "public interest," which had been in
the Act since 1927, imposed a duty on broadcasters to discuss
both sides of controversial public issues. In other words, the
amendment vindicated the FCC's general view that the Fair-
ness Doctrine inhered in the public interest standard. 16
The implication was that unless the public interest standard
itself, which is the foundation of broadcast regulation, was al-
tered, the Fairness Doctrine, and the content regulations sub-
sumed under it, could not be altered or eliminated. In order to
terminate the Fairness Doctrine without disturbing the public
interest standard, the Commission eventually determined that
conditions in the media marketplace had drastically changed
since Red Lion, and therefore, the Fairness Doctrine no longer
served the public interest. 6 9
B. Support of the Fairness Doctrine: The FCC's 1974 Report
In 1974, recognizing the changes in the media marketplace
since its last assessment of the Fairness Doctrine and the con-
troversy that continued after Red Lion, the Commission un-
dertook a wide-ranging inquiry into the Fairness Doctrine. 7 0
After receiving numerous comments and proposals, the Com-
mission reaffirmed its existing policy that the Fairness Doc-
trine was consistent with the principle of uninhibited debate,
did not have a chilling effect on broadcasters, and was compat-
tional monopoly of a scarce resource which the Government has denied
others the right to use.
Id. at 391.
166. Id. at 393.
167. The Court wrote: "[T]he Congress has not just kept its silence by refusing to
overturn the administrative construction, but has ratified it with positive legisla-
tion." Id. at 381-82.
168. Id, at 380.
169. See 1987 Syracuse, supra note 10, at paras. 72-78.
170. See 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 7.
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ible with the public interest.17 1
The 1974 Fairness Report concluded that the scarcity basis
of broadcast regulation was still valid, and that the "effective
development of an electronic medium with an abundance of
channels ... is still very much a thing of the future. ' 172 The
Report also supported the Fairness Doctrine on constitutional
and policy grounds and recognized the first amendment rights
of the audience: "[W]e do not believe that it would be appro-
priate-or even permissible-for a government agency
charged with the allocation of the channels now available to
ignore the legitimate First Amendment interests of the gen-
eral public."' 7 3 The 1974 Fairness Report also accepted that
Congress had codified the Doctrine in the 1959 amendment. 74
In sum, the Commission found that the Fairness Doctrine was
recognized in statute, justified on constitutional grounds, and
served the public interest by furthering robust debate over the
airwaves.7  But the 1974 Fairness Report did little to satisfy
critics who intensified their efforts to abolish the Doctrine.
76
171. The Commission wrote that, in the years since Red Lion, "we have seen no
credible evidence that our policies have in fact had 'the net effect of reducing rather
than enhancing the volume and quality of coverage.'" Id at para. 17 (quoting Red
Lion, 395 U.S. at 393). The Commission expressed surprise at the claim that the
Fairness Doctrine prevented broadcasters from covering controversial issues. It
noted the lack of burdensome procedures involved with enforcement of the Doc-
trine, and its reliance on broadcasters' good-faith effort to fulfill its obligations. The
Commission added that "[flar from inhibiting debate . . . we believe that the Doc-
trine has done much to expand and enrich it." Id. at para. 14.
172. Id at para. 13. The Commission determined that "scarcity is still very much
with us, and ... despite recent advances in technology, there are still 'substantially
more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate.'" Id
(quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388).
173. Id. The 1974 Fairness Report stated that if broadcasters avoid controversial
issues because the presentation of opposing viewpoints is "too offensive" or "too dis-
ruptive to their broadcast schedules" or "simply too much trouble," such an attitude
is "completely inconsistent with the broadcaster's role as a public trustee." Id. at
para. 17.
174. "In 1959, Congress specifically amended the Communications Act so as to
vindicate the Commission's view that fairness inhered in the general public interest
standard of the Act." Id at para. 12 n.6.
175. In its opening paragraphs, the 1974 Fairness Report quoted New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), recognizing "the nation's commitment, as em-
bodied in the First Amendment, to 'uninhibited, robust, wide-open' debate on public
issues." See 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 7, at para. 1.
176. Two years after the 1974 Fairness Report, the Commission issued the Recon-
sideration of the 1974 Fairness Report, The Handling of Public Issues under the
Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 58 F.C.C.2d 691 (1976). In the 1976 Reconsidera-
tion, the FCC chairman suggested in a separate statement that Congress and the
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Ten years later, based upon the need to reassess the impact of
technological changes on the media marketplace and develop-
ments in first amendment law, the Commission again initiated
inquiry proceedings.'77 The 1985 Fairness Report came to very
different conclusions about the Fairness Doctrine and began
the process that led to its abolition.
C. The Beginning of the End: The FCC's 1985 Report on the
Fairness Doctrine
By 1985, the composition and philosophical outlook of the
Commission had radically changed from that of the 1974 Com-
mission. The Commission of the mid-1980's operated in a reg-
ulatory environment that promoted, and largely accepted, the
theory that the marketplace, not intrusive government poli-
cies, should regulate the broadcasting industry.
The 1985 Fairness Report 178 paved the way for the demise of
the Doctrine two years later by attacking it on three grounds.
First, the Commission determined that the scarcity rationale
was no longer viable because broadcast outlets were no longer
scarce. 79 The existence of new technologies such as cable,
low-power television, and satellites, as well as the proliferation
of print media such as newspapers and magazines, provided di-
verse and competitive sources of information; thus, the scar-
city rationale could no longer be relied on to provide a
constitutional basis for the Fairness Doctrine. 80
Second, the Commission held that the Fairness Doctrine vi-
olated the first amendment rights of broadcasters and had a
chilling effect on their ability to disseminate news and infor-
mation.' The Commission, mindful that the Supreme Court
had found the Fairness Doctrine to be constitutional in Red
Lion, did not directly challenge its constitutional basis.8 2
FCC should reform the Doctrine. Neither was responsive. Id. at 700-01. See Morton,
From Fair to Unconstitutional: The History and Future of the Fairness Doctrine, 18
CUMi. L. REV. 743 (1988).
177. Inquiry into the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Licensees, 49 Fed.
Reg. 20,317 (1984).
178. See 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 7.
179. For a detailed description of new technologies, see id. at paras. 81-122, 138.
180. See id. at paras. 123-31 for discussion of the availability of print sources of
information.
181. Id. at paras. 19, 139-40.
182. See id. at para. 6. The Commission wrote: "Administrative agencies are not
tasked with the duty to adjudicate the constitutionality of a federal statute." Id. at
para. 18.
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Rather, the 1985 Fairness Report attacked the Doctrine indi-
rectly by finding that the marketplace had changed dramati-
cally: "[I]n the intervening sixteen years [since Red Lion] the
information services marketplace has expanded markedly,
thereby making it unnecessary to rely upon intrusive govern-
ment regulation in order to assure that the public has access to
the marketplace of ideas.'
8 3
Because the Supreme Court held in Red Lion that promo-
tion of diverse opinions was the constitutional basis of the
Doctrine, the Commission deftly challenged the constitutional-
ity of the Doctrine, while denying it was doing so, by asserting
that the Doctrine inhibited, rather than encouraged, the dis-
semination of information. By determining that the Doctrine
no longer served the public interest, the Commission avoided
the appearance that it was usurping the authority of the
Supreme Court. The Commission, however, could not avoid
rejecting Red Lion's conclusion that the Doctrine was part of
the public interest standard and thus could be abolished only
if the public interest standard were changed. The Commission
challenged this interpretation, but was unwilling to unilater-
ally abolish the Doctrine."a
183. Id at para. 6.
184. Id. at para. 21. The Commission wrote:
While we do not believe that the Fairness Doctrine is a necessary compo-
nent of the general "public interest" standard in the Communications Act,
the question of whether or not Congress in amending Section 315 in 1959
codified the Doctrine, thereby requiring us to retain it, is more problem-
atic .... [W]e believe that it would be inappropriate at this time for us to
either eliminate or significantly restrict the scope of the Doctrine.
Id. at para. 7. The Commission's strategy to avoid directly confronting the constitu-
tional status of the Fairness Doctrine with changes in the media marketplace was
surprising in light of the Supreme Court's apparent willingness to reconsider scar-
city. In FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), Justice Brennan rec-
ognized that the scarcity rationale had come under attack in recent years, but said
the Supreme Court would reconsider it as the underlying principle of regulation
only after the FCC or Congress determined that changes in the marketplace war-
ranted such a reexamination. Id at 376-77 n.11. If, however, the Commission did
show that the Fairness Doctrine had the effect of reducing, rather than enhancing,
speech "we would then be forced to reconsider the constitutional basis of our deci-
sion [in Red Lion]." Id at 378-79 n.12. In responding to the dicta in League of Wo-
men Voters, the Commission wrote:
We would agree that the courts may well be persuaded that the transforma-
tion in the communications marketplace justifies the adoption of a standard
that accords the same degree of constitutional protection to broadcast jour-
nalists as currently applies to journalists of other media. We do not believe,
however, that it is necessary or appropriate for us to make that determina-
tion in this proceeding.
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On the central question of whether the Fairness Doctrine
chilled the presentation of contrasting points of view on con-
troversial issues, the Commission accepted as empirical proof
examples of the chilling effect that were supplied by broad-
casters." 5 The Commission also indicated that the paucity of
cases arising from part one of the Fairness Doctrine evidenced
a chilling of broadcasters by the Doctrine.8 6 The Commission
held that because part one, mandating coverage of controver-
sial issues, was rarely invoked, broadcasters consciously re-
frained from presenting programs on controversial subjects.8 7
The Commission concluded that broadcasters avoided poten-
tial trouble under part two by ignoring their responsibilities
under part one.' 8 The Commission also recognized broadcast-
ers' fear that a failure to abide by the Fairness Doctrine could
1985 Fairness Report, supra note 7, at para. 17.
185. The forty-five examples cited in the 1985 Fairness Report were supposedly
instances where broadcasters were either inhibited from covering controversial is-
sues or were punished by having to expend financial and human resources to defend
Fairness Doctrine complaints. The Commission's acceptance of these examples in
the 1985 Fairness Report has been severely criticized. See S. REP. No. 34, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1987). See also Bolton, supra note 3 (finding the examples defi-
cient on several grounds). The Commission relied on evidence submitted by inter-
ested individuals and groups, and particularly relied on the statements of individual
broadcasters and the National Association of Broadcasters. Bolton noted that many
of the statements were anonymous and anecdotal, that some presented nothing more
than complaints about the "nature of the justice system rather than complaints
unique to the Fairness Doctrine," and some examples cited by the Commission "ac-
tually showed the Fairness Doctrine to be working when broadcasters refrained
from airing one-sided programs." Id. at 817-18. Ferris and Kirkland also criticized
the data used by the Commission: "In 1974, after two years of study consuming
thousands of staff hours, the FCC concluded that there was 'no credible evidence of
a chilling effect.' Again, in 1984, the National Association of Broadcasters, presuma-
bly after an exhaustive search, could produce only a few instances of a supposed
chilling effect." See Ferris & Kirkland, supra note 49, at 615.
186. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 7, at paras. 29, 69-71.
187. See id. at paras. 26-29, 42-45, 69-71.
188. Ferris and Kirkland are critical of broadcasters who ignored part one:
By saying they are "chilled," broadcasters, in effect, admit noncompliance
with this part of the doctrine. It is also strange that critics of the fairness
rules believe that a pattern of violation of one part of the rules is a good
argument for repeal of all of the fairness rules. In any event, it is more
probable that if any chilling effect is present, it results from economic in-
centives and not from the minimal standards of fairness imposed by the
Fairness Doctrine. The simple fact is that coverage of controversial issues is
not as profitable as airing "sitcoms" or blooper shows, and advertisers are
reluctant to support controversial programming. If anything, the Fairness
Doctrine and political broadcasting rules provide an antidote to this chilling
effect.
See Ferris & Kirkland, supra note 49, at 615.
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result in license revocation, and that, because of the value of a
license, a "raised eyebrow" was sufficient to force otherwise
"intrepid" broadcasters to run "for the cover of conformity.'
18 9
Finally, the Commission concluded that Congress had not
codified the Doctrine in the 1959 amendment to section 315.190
Nevertheless, it decided that the ambiguity was too great for
the Commission to repeal the Doctrine on its own, at least for
the time being.'
D. The One-Two Punch: TRAC and Meredith and the Death of
the Fairness Doctrine
Shortly after the Commission issued the 1985 Fairness Re-
port, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in
Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC
(TRA C), 192 held that Congress had not codified the Doctrine in
its 1959 amendment to section 315 of the Communications Act,
and thus gave the Commission ammunition to wrestle the
Doctrine away from Congress and eventually abolish it.
In TRAC, a public interest group appealed an FCC ruling
that certain content regulations,'93 including the Fairness Doc-
trine, did not apply to teletext. 94 According to the court, the
189. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 7, at para. 31. See Bazelon, The First
Amendment and the "New Media"--New Directions in Regulating Telecommunica-
tions, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 201 (1979). Only in Brandywine-Main Line Radio, 24
F.C.C.2d 18 (1970), has the Commission revoked the license of a broadcaster because
of Fairness Doctrine violations. See 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 7, at para. 32
n.75.
190. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 7, at paras. 141-74.
191. Id. at paras. 174-76. The Commission stated:
The doctrine has been a longstanding administrative policy and a central
tenet of broadcast regulation in which Congress has shown a strong
although often ambivalent interest .... Because of the intense Congres-
sional interest in the fairness doctrine and pendency of legislative proposals,
we have determined that it would be inappropriate at this time to eliminate
the fairness doctrine.
Id. at para. 176.
192. 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 806 F.2d 1115 (1986), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987).
193. The two statutes related to access to broadcasting by qualified candidates for
public office: 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1982) required broadcasters to "allow reasonable
access ... for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for
Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy"; and 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982)
stated that if the licensee "permit[s] any person who is a legally qualified candidate
for any public office to use a broadcasting station," the broadcaster incurs the addi-
tional obligation of "afford[ing] equal opportunities to all other such candidates for
that office." TRAC, 801 F.2d at 502.
194. Teletext "provides a means of transmitting textual and graphic material to
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Commission, in exempting teletext from the Fairness Doc-
trine, "premised its decision on the fact that Congress never
actually codified the Commission's Fairness Doctrine, and that
the Commission, therefore, had no obligation to extend its
own policy to new services like teletext.' 195
The court began by asserting that the Fairness Doctrine did
apply to teletext because it imposed obligations on licensees in
the use of their "broadcast time." Teletext, Judge Bork wrote,
is broadcast time. "We find it clear, therefore, that the Fair-
ness Doctrine by its terms applies to teletext; no extension is
necessary."'1 96 In fact, the court noted that the Commission de-
cision was an "affirmative departure" from precedent because
it stated that a licensee's fairness obligations "apply only to a.
part of its broadcast time."'1 97
The key question was whether the Commission had the au-
thority to make such a departure, or whether only Congress
could authorize such a drastic change in policy. Judge Bork,
concentrating exclusively on the language of the 1959 amend-
ment, rejected it as a codification of the Fairness Doctrine. He
wrote:
[W]e do not believe that the language adopted in 1959 made
the Fairness Doctrine a binding statutory obligation; rather, it
ratified the Commission's longstanding position that the pub-
lic interest standard authorizes the Fairness Doctrine. The
language, by its plain import, neither creates nor imposes any
obligation, but seeks to make it clear that the statutory
amendment does not affect the Fairness Doctrine obligation
as the Commission had previously applied it. The words em-
ployed by Congress also demonstrate that the obligation rec-
ognized and preserved was an administrative construction, not
a binding statutory directive. 98
the television screens of home viewers." TRAC, 801 F.2d at 502. Teletext is often
transmitted over an unused portion of the television broadcast signal. To receive the
images carried over that portion of the signal, viewers must purchase decoders from
retail stores.
195. Id at 516-17. The petitioners, TRAC and the Media Access Project, disputed
this interpretation, arguing that the Fairness Doctrine "is a statutory obligation that
requires all broadcasting services to provide reasonable opportunities for the presen-
tation of contrasting viewpoints on controversial matters of public importance." Id
at 517 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 34-35).
196. id at 517.
197. Id.
198. Id. The court held, therefore, that because the Fairness Doctrine derives
from the mandate to serve the public interest, the "Commission is not bound to ad-
here to a view of the Fairness Doctrine that covers teletext." I& at 518. See Greater
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The FCC probably could have abolished the Doctrine on the
basis of the TRAC decision alone. But the Commission, fear-
ing congressional reprisals, instead relied on the strategy rec-
ommended in its 1985 Fairness Report and urged
congressional repeal of the Doctrine. 19 The Fairness Doctrine
may well have survived TRAC were it not for another court of
appeals decision that, in effect, gave the Commission the op-
portunity it had long sought to declare the Doctrine unconsti-
tutional and abolish it.
The Doctrine's death knell began in 1984 when a citizens
group complained that a Syracuse television station violated
the Fairness Doctrine by airing advertisements promoting a
nuclear power plant without presenting opposing view-
points.200 After the Commission upheld the challenge (the
first such ruling by the FCC since President Reagan began ap-
pointing its members in 1981), the television station's parent
company, Meredith Corporation, appealed the decision to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
In Meredith Corp. v. FCC,2 °1 the court of appeals ruled that
the Commission had failed to adequately consider the issue of
the Doctrine's constitutionality, which Meredith had raised as
a defense.0 2 The court accepted Meredith's argument that
even if the Commission was not obligated to address the gen-
eral constitutionality of the Doctrine, °0 it "clearly had to re-
spond to Meredith's claim that the Doctrine could not
constitutionally be applied in this case. ' 20 4 While the court un-
derstood that the Commission was in the unenviable position
of having to examine the Doctrine's constitutionality-and
that a finding that the Doctrine was unconstitutional would
Boston Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (recognizing the right of an
administrative agency to change its view of what is in the public interest, with or
without a change in circumstances).
199. 102 F.C.C.2d 143, 156 (1985).
200. Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council v. WTVH, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 99 F.C.C.2d 1389 (1984). WTVH (Meredith) had broadcast a series of editorial
advertisements advocating the construction of the Nine Mile Point II nuclear plant
as a sound investment for New York. The Commission determined that those ads
presented a controversial issue of public importance, and concluded that WTVH, by
refusing to broadcast ads challenging those by advocates of the nuclear plant, had
not met its obligations under the Fairness Doctrine. See also 1987 Syracuse, supra
note 10, at para. 7.
201. 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
202. Id at 872.
203. Id. at 873-74.
204. Id. at 874 n.12.
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infuriate key members of Congress-nevertheless, it found the
Commission's failure to face the issue "the very paradigm of
arbitrary and capricious administrative action. '20
The court further noted that the constitutional issue might
have been avoided if the Commission had found that the Doc-
trine violated the public interest standard of the Communica-
tions Act.2 °6 However, the court added that it was "aware of
no precedent that permits a federal agency to ignore a consti-
tutional challenge to the application of its own policy merely
because the resolution would be politically awkward. '20 7
Adding to the Commission's problems, while Meredith was
being considered, various broadcasting organizations sought ju-
dicial review of the 1985 Fairness Report on the grounds that
the Commission's failure to institute rule-making proceedings
to eliminate the Fairness Doctrine was arbitrary and capri-
cious. 208 Therefore, the D.C. Circuit Court was asked, in Ra-
dio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC (RTNDA), to
declare the Fairness Doctrine unconstitutional and, in Mere-
dith, to hold that the Commission's failure to consider the con-
stitutional issues was arbitrary and capricious.
When the court vacated RTNDA and remanded Meredith
with instructions that the Commission consider the constitu-
tional question, the FCC must have felt that its strategy had
backfired. 0 9 It had advanced RTNDA because the Commis-
sion, and broadcasters, had hoped that the court of appeals
would declare the Fairness Doctrine unconstitutional, thus
sparing the Commission the wrath of Congress. Instead, the
court of appeals vacated RTNDA and remanded Meredith for a
determination on the constitutionality of the Doctrine, which
is precisely what the Commission wanted to avoid.
The FCC seized the opportunity presented by Meredith to
review the constitutionality of the Doctrine and on August 7,
205. Id. at 874. The court noted: "Federal officials are not only bound by the
Constitution, they must also take a specific oath to support and defend it .... To
enforce a Commission-generated policy that the Commission itself believes is uncon-
stitutional may well constitute a violation of that oath." Id
206. Id
207. Id.
208. Radio-Television News Directors Ass'n v. FCC, 809 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
vacated, 831 F.2d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
209. The Meredith court added: "Of course, the Commission need not confront
that issue if it concludes that in light of its Fairness Report it may not or should not
enforce the doctrine because it is contrary to the public interest." Id. at 874.
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1987, concluded that the "Fairness Doctrine, on its face, vio-
lates the first amendment and contravenes the public
interest. 21
0
In 1987 Syracuse, the Commission reaffirmed the findings of
the 1985 Fairness Report.211 The Commission reiterated its
view that the Fairness Doctrine chills speech. 2  The FCC de-
termined that, although the Supreme Court upheld the Doc-
trine in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the underlying
factual predicates for that decision had been eroded.1
The Commission rejected Syracuse Peace Council's recom-
mendation that the FCC avoid considering the constitutional
question by resolving the case on the narrow factual issue of
whether Meredith had violated the Fairness Doctrine.1 4 The
Commission, recognizing that the Court had expressly af-
firmed its finding that WTVH had violated the Doctrine, re-
fused to "revisit" that determination and found that part of
the case was final.21 5 Thus, the Commission considered the
larger issue of whether the Doctrine is "consistent with the
guarantees of the First Amendment... and comports with the
public interest. 2 1 6 In the Commission's view, those two issues
were "inextricably intertwined," and the policy considerations
could not be isolated from the constitutional aspects underly-
ing the Doctrine. 7
210. See 1987 Syracuse, supra note 10, at para. 2.
211. Id at paras. 52-61. For a discussion of the 1985 Fairness Report, see supra
notes 178-91 and accompanying text.
212. See generally 1987 Syracuse, supra note 10, at paras. 42-51.
213. See generally id at paras. 37-51. The Commission repeated its reasons for
not abolishing the Doctrine at the time of the 1985 Fairness Report. It expressed
concern about "intense Congressional interest in the Fairness Doctrine" and "uncer-
tainty as to whether the doctrine was in fact codified .. " Id at para. 6.
214. Id, at paras. 17-18.
215. See id,
216. Id at para. 19.
217. Id, The Commission identified three reasons why the policy and constitu-
tional issues cannot be considered separately. First, it has been well established that
first amendment considerations are an integral component of the public interest
standard. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 122 (1973); Asso-
ciated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). In the Commission's words: "A
meaningful assessment of the propriety of the doctrine ... necessarily includes an
evaluation of its constitutionality." 1987 Syracuse, supra note 10, at para. 19. Sec-
ond, the Commission held that promotion of first amendment principles was the
"core policy objective in establishing and maintaining the doctrine." Id at para. 21.
The Commission added: "if the doctrine fails to further First Amendment principles,
it necessarily follows that the doctrine does not achieve the specific purpose for
which it was intended and can no longer be sustained." Id Third, the Commission
held that the courts have found the FCC's long experience in regulation of broad-
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The Commission carefully reviewed Red Lion in light of
what it considered to be the changing conditions of the mar-
ketplace and found that the Fairness Doctrine disserves both
the public's right to diverse sources of information and the
broadcaster's interest in free expression.218 The Commission
further noted that the Doctrine's chilling effect thwarts its in-
tended purpose and results in excessive and unnecessary inter-
vention into the editorial processes of broadcast journalists. 219
The Commission concluded "that under the constitutional
standard established by Red Lion and its progeny, the Fairness
Doctrine contravenes the First Amendment and its enforce-
ment is no longer in the public interest. '220
The Commission further noted that, although there are
physical differences between electronic and print media,
"their roles in our society are identical, and we believe that
the same First Amendment principles should be equally appli-
cable to both."'221
To the disappointment of broadcasters, the Commission at-
tempted to preserve the public interest standard, while main-
taining that print and electronic media should be treated
equally.222 The Commission made it clear that, while part one
casting "informative" and have recognized that "in evaluating... First Amendment
claims... we [courts] must afford great weight to the decisions of Congress and the
experience of the Commission." Id. at para. 22.
218. 1987 Syracuse, supra note 10, at paras. 55-82.
219. Id. at paras. 42-61.
220. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 7, at para. 61. The Commission rejected
criticism that it should eliminate only part two of the Doctrine, since part one
presented so few problems for broadcasters and broadcasters should be required to
present programs on controversial issues. The Commission wrote:
The Fairness Doctrine, although consisting of two parts, is a unified doc-
trine; without both parts, the doctrine loses its identity.... [I]f the constitu-
tional infirmity of the doctrine arises from the enforcement of one of its
parts, we do not believe it appropriate to sever that part of the doctrine and
to continue enforcing only the other part.
Id. at para. 83.
221. 1987 Syracuse, supra note 10, at para. 99. The Commission expressed the
concern that its members, who had taken an oath to support and defend the Consti-
tution, could not enforce a policy that the Commission itself believed to be unconsti-
tutional. It concluded that the Constitution prevents the Commission from
enforcing the Fairness Doctrine against station WTVH. Id. at para. 98.
222. Id. at paras. 80-81. The Commission wrote that "the fact that government
may not impose unconstitutional conditions on the receipt of a public benefit does
not preclude the Commission's ability, and obligation, to license broadcasters in the
public interest, convenience and necessity." Id. at para. 81. The opinion added:
"The Commission may still impose certain conditions on licensees in furtherance of
this public interest obligation. Nothing in this decision, therefore, is intended to call
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of the Fairness Doctrine was no longer in effect, broadcasters
were still required to observe the "responsive" programming
obligation.223
Contemporaneous with the issuance of the Memorandum
Opinion and Order abolishing the Doctrine, the Commission
released its report on alternatives to the Fairness Doctrine,
prepared at the request of Congress. 224 That report concluded
that the public interest would be best served by an "unregu-
lated marketplace of ideas," similar to the print media, with
no requirement that all sides of an issue be presented.225
Broadcaster reaction to abolition of the Doctrine was swift
and enthusiastic, 226 while some members of Congress ex-
pressed disappointment. 27 For broadcasters, victory meant
not only liberation from the obligations imposed under the
Doctrine, but a signal that the basis of repeal had undermined
all content regulations and, therefore, may portend a day in
which broadcasters are free from such regulations.
The Commission's repeal of the Doctrine was appealed by
Syracuse Peace Council. The challengers argued that, con-
trary to the TRAC decision, the Doctrine was mandated by sec-
tion 315 of the Communications Act, and that the FCC had
into question the validity of the public interest standard under the Communications
Act." Id. The Commission made it clear, however, that it will not second-guess
broadcasters' ascertainment or fault a broadcaster for failing to address a particular
issue in its programming. Id. at para. 59.
223. Id. at para. 34.
224. In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
Concerning Alternatives to the General Fairness Obligations of Broadcast Licensees,
2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5272 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Fairness Report]. This inquiry was insti-
tuted in response to a statutory directive to the Commission "to consider alternative
means of administration and enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine and to report to
the Congress by September 30, 1987." Appropriations Act of Oct. 18, 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-500, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 1783-87.
225. 1987 Fairness Report, supra note 224, at para. 171. The Commission rejected
a number of alternatives to the Fairness Doctrine, including proposals that access for
differing viewpoints on controversial issues be guaranteed. Id. at paras. 54-88.
226. See Fairness Held Unfair, BROADCASTING, Aug. 10, 1987, at 27. The article
began: "The FCC shattered last week the symbol of broadcasting's second-class First
Amendment status, declaring unconstitutional its 38-year old Fairness Doctrine re-
quiring broadcasters to air all sides of controversial public issues." Id. FCC Chair-
man Dennis Patrick was quoted as saying "our action today should be cause for
celebration, because by it we introduce the First Amendment into the 20th Cen-
tury." Id.
227. The chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Rep. John
Dingell (D-Michigan), was especially incensed. See Broadcasters and the Fairness
Doctrine: Hearings on HR. 1934, Before Subcommittee on Telecommunications and
Finance, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1987).
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neither the authority to repeal it, nor an adequate basis for
doing so. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia recently rejected the challenge, holding that the Commis-
sion's determination that the Doctrine did not serve the public
interest was supported by its record in the proceeding. 28 But
broadcasters' celebration has been tempered by efforts on the
part of Congress to restore the Doctrine. 229
IV
Scarcity and Diversity in the Post-Fairness
Doctrine Era
The Commission relied heavily on the increase in the
number of radio and television stations since Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC and the 1974 Fairness Report as justifica-
tion for abolishing the Fairness Doctrine.230 The Commission
argued that if the scarcity rationale ever justified content reg-
ulation, conditions in the media marketplace had changed to
the extent that such regulation is now unnecessary, counter-
productive, and harmful to the first amendment. 23 1
The Commission's reliance on Red Lion was largely mis-
placed. While the Supreme Court made reference to scarcity
of resources,23 2 its Red Lion decision was based on the princi-
ple that restricted access entitles the government to regulate
228. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 1475 (D.C. Cir. Feb.
10, 1989). The court declined to reach the Commission's finding that the Doctrine
was unconstitutional. Id. See also Meredith Among Many in News Media Support-
ing Fairness Appeal, BROADCASTING, Aug. 1, 1988, at 66.
229. President Reagan vetoed the Fairness in Broadcasting Act, S. 742, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), which would have codified the Fairness Doctrine. 23 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 715 (June 29, 1987).
230. For example, the Commission reported that in 1985, the number of television
stations overall was 1,208, an increase of 44.3% since Red Lion and 28% since the
1974 Fairness Report. By August 1987, that number had increased to 1,315, a 57%
increase since Red Lion. The Commission noted that the number of UHF stations
had increased by 113% since the Red Lion decision and 66.4% since the 1974 Fairness
Report. While the Commission held that over-the-air broadcasting signals would be
enough to provide the public with access to diverse sources of information, the
growth of cable television had enhanced significantly the amount of information
available to the public. The Commission also discussed new technologies such as
low-power television, videocassette recorders, and satellite systems. 1987 Syracuse,
supra note 10, at paras. 78-82.
231. Id. at para. 61.
232. The court observed:
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to
put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be ex-
pressed on this unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their in-
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the channels by which ideas are communicated."' Although
related to the issue of scarcity, Red Lion approved the Fair-
ness Doctrine because it protected "the right of the public to
receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and
other ideas and experiences."2 4 Some commentators have
suggested that governmentally-forced speech is contrary to
first amendment jurisprudence.235 Nevertheless, this principle
is at the heart of the regulation of broadcasting in the public
interest.
If the goal of the first amendment is to remove barriers that
interfere with communication, then the concern is not with
the number of radio and television stations currently on the
air, but instead with the availability of differing ideas. Devel-
opment of sources of electronic communication has meant an
increase in channels without a concomitant growth in diverse
opinions on important public issues.26 Emancipating broad-
casters from content regulation in an environment rich with
channels of electronic communication may seem entirely con-
sistent with the principles of the first amendment. Upon close
examination, however, the regulatory environment reveals the
need for continued supervision by the federal government,
although along different lines from previous efforts.
A. "Micro" Scarcity v. "Macro" Diversity
Today in the United States, there are an enormous number
of outlets of communication. Thousands of books, magazines,
and newspapers are published each year.23 7  Additionally,
there are thousands of radio and television stations, low-power
TV stations, cable systems bringing up to 100 channels or more
into the home, along with teletext, videotext, and other com-
munication systems.238
Despite the large number of total outlets, entrance into
broadcasting markets is still severely limited. Regardless of
terest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium
function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment."
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
233. See Hyde, supra note 3, at 1188; see also Ferris & Kirkland, supra note 49, at
611.
234. 395 U.S. at 390.
235. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 4, at 155.
236. See Hyde, supra note 3, at 1190.
237. See 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 7, at paras. 123-24.
238. Id. at paras. 84-122.
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the total number of outlets, as long as a broadcaster is granted
a license to operate on a certain frequency, all others are de-
nied use of that frequency.2 9 There are numerous cities in the
United States where there are no available frequencies and
thus no access to the market.240
Proponents of deregulation, in arguing that broadcasting
channels are no longer a scarce resource, mistakenly assume
that every "channel" of communication is of equal value.24'
Thus, independent television stations and cable shopping
channels, which may offer no news or public affairs program-
ming, are equated with network-affiliated full-service VHF
stations. Yet, neither the independent station without a news
department, nor the cable shopping channel provides ideas
that further the goals of self-government and the first amend-
ment. It is misleading to suggest that an obscure public access
channel or a cable shopping outlet equals a full-power, over-
the-air television station affiliated with one of the major
networks.
Proponents of deregulation are fond of pointing to the cities
that have only one or two daily newspapers but several dozen
radio and television stations.242 If there is any scarcity, the ar-
gument goes, it is clearly in the print industry, not in
broadcasting.243
While there may be macro diversity in the aggregate
number of total communication outlets, there is still much
micro scarcity. A licensee, at no cost other than an application
fee, receives exclusive use of a communication channel from
the public domain. With the exception of a few limited access
requirements mandated by the Communications Act, a licen-
see, especially in today's deregulatory environment, may oper-
239. The Communications Act expressly denies any right of access to use the
channel licensed to a broadcaster except for equal time rules that apply to political
campaigns, rules guaranteeing reasonable access for federal political candidates,
political editorial rules, and the right of reply under the personal-attack rules. 47
U.S.C. § 151 (1987).
240. The FCC, in its 1985 Fairness Report, argued that there are frequencies that
remain vacant and for which there has been no demand. See 1985 Fairness Report,
supra note 7, at paras. 103-04. See also Fowler & Brenner, supra note 5, at 224-25.
These frequencies, however, are often undesirable for either technical or financial
reasons (i.e., poor signal quality or small market).
241. See Ferris & Kirkland, supra note 49, at 611.
242. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 5, at 225 n.82.
243. The Commission made a similar argument in its 1985 Fairness Report, supra
note 7, at paras. 123-31.
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ate the station in almost any way it sees fit. These minimal
access provisions are all that stand between the broadcaster's
unabridged right to exclude all other voices from the airwaves
and the public's right to hear differing opinions.2"
It is unreasonable to suggest that if the public cannot hear
discussion of important issues on a given broadcasting station,
or gain access to the frequency it uses, it should turn to one of
the other dozens of outlets in that market for discussion.
Many of the other outlets are neither equipped, nor commer-
cially able, to provide programs on vital local issues. If they
are devoted to home shopping, movies, syndicated game shows,
and reruns of old network shows, they cannot provide alterna-
tive sources of information anywhere equal to that of a major
station.
B. The Cost of Stations
The clearest evidence that scarcity still exists, and that di-
versity of electronic outlets may be years away, is the ex-
traordinary financial value of broadcasting stations.
Broadcasting continues to be one of the most profitable busi-
nesses. 1 5 The escalating price of stations, while leveling off
recently, is testimony to the confidence of investors in the in-
dustry and to the recognition that very few good frequencies
are ever available.
A station's value lies almost entirely in its license. A few
years ago, a Los Angeles TV station was sold for $510 million,
after having been purchased for $245 million only two years
earlier. The station's value increased at a daily rate of
$285,000.246 During its battle to retain its license, a Chicago
television station owned by CBS was estimated to be worth
244. The audience would most probably have little trouble identifying a broad-
caster who consistently aired programs promoting a single point of a view on an
important issue and excluding all others. What would be much harder for the public
to discern, and, therefore, potentially more harmful to its interests, is a station that
ignored an important issue. It is expecting a lot from average viewers that they be
so well informed as to know when coverage of an issue is lacking. The suggestion
that they may learn about such issues from print media does not relieve broadcasters
of their responsibility to serve the public interest by airing programs dealing with
important local problems.
245. See Good News from the Future, BROADCASTING, Nov. 28, 1988, at 53; TV in
1995: Looking Good, BROADCASTING, Jan. 2, 1989, at 39-40; Nader & Riley, supra
note 8, at 49.
246. BROADCASTING, May 20, 1985, at 39.
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between $500 and $600 million dollars.247
A broadcaster can have a mediocre or even poor record of
public service and still keep the profits from "selling" its gov-
ernment license. RKO, a company whose record of deceiving
the FCC, violating securities laws, and poor public service was
so horrendous it was one of the few broadcasting companies
ever to lose a major television license, was able to sell its Los
Angeles station in 1988 for $324 million. The FCC claimed
this was appropriate punishment because that figure repre-
sented only about two-thirds of its market value.248 Even after
the company was determined by an administrative law judge
to be unfit to be a licensee, the Commission allowed RKO to
sell its stations for huge profits.249
It is inconceivable that broadcast licenses would be worth
such gigantic sums, and would appreciate in value at such a
fantastic rate, were it not for their scarcity.250 Broadcasters
who pay large sums for stations, sometimes as much as twenty
times cash flow, take on huge debts that can only be paid with
-high advertising revenues or by reducing expenses. News and
public affairs departments may be the first place new owners
look to save money. Even employees previously thought to be
performing essential tasks in news and public affairs may be
fired.
C. The End of Regulation
The public interest standard that has governed broadcasting
247. Settlement Reached in WBBM-.TV Chicago Challenge, BROADCASTING, July
18, 1988, at 33. In 1988, a company paid $79 million for an FM radio station in Los
Angeles, the highest purchase price ever paid for a single radio station. Tedesco, FM
Outlet in L.A. Sells for $79 Million, ELECTRONIC MEDIA,. July 4, 1988, at 3.
248. Hershey, FCC Approves 2 Settlements by Gencorp, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1988,
at 27, col. 3. An FCC administrative law judge had ruled that RKO was unfit to be a
licensee because of violations of FCC rules, including fraudulent billing and misrep-
resentations to the Commission. FCC to Approve Settlement Transferring KHJTV
to Disney, BROADCASTING, July 18, 1988, at 32. In 1980, RKO lost its license to oper-
ate a Boston station, WNAC-TV, estimated to be worth around $450 million. Her-
shey, supra, at 27, col. 3. See RKO General, Inc. v. FCC, 670 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
249. See FCC Gives RKO Green Light to Sell Stations, BROADCASTING, July 25,
1988, at 33.
250. There was some evidence in 1988 that the rapid appreciation of broadcast
properties was slowing down. Nevertheless, in the first half of 1988, 23 TV stations
were sold for a total of $365 million. TV Station Sales: The List Grows Longer,
BROADCASTING, July 18, 1988, at 32.
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for sixty years is under attack from many sides.25 The FCC,
which exhibits classic symptoms of being too closely associated
with the industry it is supposed to regulate,252 has considered
relieving broadcasters of their public interest obligations.253
Broadcasters argue that competition in the marketplace will
do more to ensure that the public interest is served than gov-
ernment regulation. There is strong sentiment within broad-
casting that now that the Fairness Doctrine has been
abolished, the other content regulations are vulnerable to
attack.254
The stalemate over how broadcasting should be regulated
will continue. The public, represented either by members of
Congress or by one of the few public interest groups that cov-
ers the broadcasting industry, finds it difficult to convince the
Commission to enforce, and broadcasters to accept, regulation
of the industry. As long as broadcasters believe they may op-
251. Broadcasting magazine has suggested that because the Communications Act
refers to the obligation of the FCC to regulate broadcasting in the public interest,
broadcasters are not necessarily bound by the public interest standard. At a mini-
mum, they are entitled to interpret for themselves how the public interest is to be
served. In an editorial, the magazine echoed the sentiments of many broadcasters:
As for the so-called public interest standard itself, few seem aware that it
does not apply to broadcasters at all. Yes, the phrase 'in the public interest,
convenience and necessity' does appear repeatedly in the Communications
Act, but it is imposed on the FCC, not on the constituents it licenses.
Hanging in There for the First Amendment, BROADCASTING, July 25, 1988, at 114.
The editorial added: "Should broadcasters operate in the public interest? Without
doubt; should and do. But... [a public interest standard is] not a quantifiable thing.
It's what every broadcaster does in his own special way." Id.
252. See R. LABUNSKI, supra note 148, at 91-116. See also Nader & Riley, supra
note 8, at 66-67.
253. The Commission is considering changes in the comparative renewal process
that would have the effect of granting a license in perpetuity. The Commission is
checking broadcaster reaction to a proposal to accept the public interest standard in
return for changes in comparative renewal. See Between a Rock and a Hard Place,
BROADCASTING, June 20, 1988, at 98. For an excellent discussion of how hard the
Commission tries to please broadcasters, and other problems of. the FCC, see John-
son, A New Fidelity to the Regulatory Ideal, 59 GEO. L.J. 884 (1971); see also Johnson
& Dystel, A Day in the Life: The Federal Communications Commission, 82 YALE
L.J. 1575 (1973).
254. It is hard to imagine an FCC more solicitous of the broadcasting industry
than that of the past few years. With the possible exception of the FCC's belated
enforcement of indecency rules (related to the broadcasting of sexually-explicit mov-
ies on TV and disc jockeys who exceed the bounds of good taste), the Commission
has done much to satisfy the demands of broadcasters for deregulation of their in-
dustry. The FCC fined a Kansas City television station $2,000, which it is appealing,
for showing an R-rated movie. See Halonen, FCC Fines K.C. Station $2,000 for
Broadcasting "Indecent" Film, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, June 27, 1988, at 3.
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erate their stations subject only to marketplace limitations,
they will not accept the government's authority to enforce the
Fairness Doctrine. On the other hand, broadcasters currently
lack the clout in Congress to force repeal of the other content
regulations.
The unsuccessful efforts to rewrite the Communications Act
of 1934 clearly demonstrate the impasse. In the late 1970's,
several bills were introduced in Congress to comprehensively
revise the Communications Act. One provided what some
thought was a workable compromise on the content regula-
tions.255 In return for modification of the Fairness Doctrine
and equal time rules, 256 and repeal of other content regula-
tions, broadcasters would be asked to pay a "spectrum-use" fee
based on the value of their frequency.257 Despite the opportu-
nity to be freed of content regulations, broadcasters de-
nounced the fee as a tax on their business and as a "form
of double liability" because some money would go to finance
"competitive government programs," that is, public
broadcasting.25 a
The long impasse over the regulation of broadcasting re-
quires some innovative measures. The solution to the problem
of how to regulate broadcasting in the public interest without
impairing the constitutional rights of broadcasters may lie in
amending the Communications Act by designating a public ac-
cess period of one hour per week, and by granting broadcast-
ers full first amendment rights during their time period. This
255. H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 16,729 (1977).
256. Section 434(a) of H.R. 13015 would have abolished the Fairness Doctrine im-
mediately for radio. For television, the Doctrine would be changed to require broad-
casters to "(1) provide news, public affairs, and locally produced programming
(including news and public affairs] throughout the broadcast day; and (2) treat con-
troversial issues of public importance in an equitable manner." The bill would have
freed radio from equal time rules and freed television from such rules in all national
and statewide election campaigns. Id.
257. Under the proposed bill, a small commercial radio station would be expected
to pay $200 to $800 annually, while a high-power, "clear-channel" radio station would
pay as much as $40,000. The assessments for VHF television stations would gener-
ally begin in the six-figure range. In the New York metropolitan area, for example,
which has the greatest number of viewing households in the country, each network-
owned station would pay about $7 million. The money would go into a telecommuni-
cations fund which would pay for a newly proposed regulatory commission (replac-
ing the FCC), for the development of programming on public broadcasting, to
stimulate minority ownership of stations, and to improve rural telecommunications.
Id. at § 413.
258. Broadcasting's Turn in Rewrite Arena, BROADCASTING, Sept. 11, 1978, at 28.
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proposal would accomplish the dual goals of providing broad-
casters first amendment parity with print media, while retain-
ing mandated access for discussion of contrasting points of
view on controversial issues.
V
The Public Interest and Public Access: After
the Fairness Doctrine
The Fairness Doctrine was a failure. While the Commission
recently rendered the Doctrine virtually useless through ne-
glect, previous Commissions violated the first amendment
rights of broadcasters by misapplying it, as in the Pensions
case.259 Content regulations, in the wrong hands, can be used
to intimidate broadcasters.2 60 Even part one of the Doctrine,
which seems so noble in its efforts to compel broadcasters to
air programs dealing with important community issues, has
been used as an excuse for not covering controversial issues.
With the limited resources the Commission has available,
and the large number of broadcasting stations that must be
monitored, it is impossible for even the most dedicated Com-
mission to enforce the Doctrine fairly and comprehensively.
The situation is further exacerbated by a Commission which
states its opposition to the Doctrine and enforces it half-heart-
259. See supra notes 106-33 and accompanying text. Krattenmaker & Powe,
supra note 4, at 155-62, identify four cases as the best examples of the failure of the
Fairness Doctrine: 1) American Sec. Council Educ. Found. (ASCEF) v. CBS, 63
F.C.C.2d 366 (1977), aff'd en bane sub nom. American Sec. Council Educ. Found. v.
FCC, 607 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1979), in which ASCEF presented the FCC with a study
of CBS News' handling of national security issues. It charged that CBS violated the
Fairness Doctrine by presenting stories suggesting the Soviet threat was less serious
than the Nixon administration perceived. The FCC declined to hold a hearing on
the issue, and dismissed the complaint for failure to present a well-defined issue.
Apparently, the Commission found that the issues presented by ASCEF were "too
big" and "too amorphous." Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 4, at 169-70; 2) In re
Petition by NBC, 25 F.C.C.2d 735 (1970), in which the Commission came to the oppo-
site conclusion where the issue presented was apparently of de minimis importance.
A private pilots association protested an NBC news report that suggested that pilots
of small planes were a danger in the crowded skies around major airports. The
Commission agreed with NBC that the program had been about "air traffic," but
determined that the problem of private pilots was a "sub-issue" and a broadcaster
need not be fair on each sub-issue. Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 4, at 170-71; 3)
the Pensions case, discussed supra at text accompanying notes 106-33; and 4) the
WXUR case, discussed supra at text accompanying notes 59-83.
260. See R. LABUNSKI, supra note 148, at 134-37, for a discussion of Nixon admin-
istration efforts to intimidate broadcasters. See also 1985 Fairness Report, supra
note 7, at paras. 74-76.
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edly, if at all. Even if the Fairness Doctrine was enthusiasti-
cally supported by the Commission, and applied in appropriate
cases, it would never achieve its stated goals. The Commission
is hampered because it is forced to either impose small mone-
tary fines or revoke a broadcaster's license. Thus, the Com-
mission must choose between slapping a licensee's wrist or
slitting its throat.26' Furthermore, courts, while they have
some supervisory responsibility over the FCC, cannot regulate
broadcasting on a day-to-day basis.
Because of proposed changes to the comparative renewal
process and the Commission's reluctance to enforce content
regulations, some alternative plan is necessary to preserve the
public's interest in broadcasting. Although controversial and a
departure from past policies, the creation of a mandated public
access period is worth serious consideration. Its adoption on
an experimental basis may provide a solution to the stalemate
over regulation of broadcasting.262
A. Access Proposals: Rejection by the FCC
The Communications Act of 1934 specifically states that a
broadcasting station is not "a common carrier," as is a tele-
phone company, whose facilities are available to all who want
to use them.26 3 Broadcasters who are granted an exclusive li-
cense to use their frequency currently cannot be forced to
261. Today's FCC would probably not have revoked the licenses of WLBT-TV and
WXUR Radio. Those revocations involved unusually extreme circumstances in a dif-
ferent era of regulation. In 1984, citizens of Dodge City, Kansas, lodged a Fairness
Doctrine complaint against KTTL-FM. The complaint was based on a series of pro-
grams presenting the views of right-wing fundamentalist ministers. Some of the pro-
grams attacked Catholics, Jews, blacks, and other minorities. Despite the similarity
to WXUR, the Commission refused to consider the Fairness Doctrine challenge, im-
posing strict requirements on those who brought the fairness complaint. See Cattle
Country Broadcasting, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,272 (1985).
262. See Canby, The First Amendment Right to Persuade: Access to Radio and
Television, 19 UCLA L. REV. 723, 723-31 (1972).
263. Section 3(h) of the Communications Act states that "a person engaged in...
broadcasting shall not ... be deemed a common carrier." 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1987).
See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 699-702 (1979) (holding that the FCC
exceeded its authority under the Communications Act in requiring certain cable sys-
tems to provide access to facilities). Congress has since authorized cities to require
access channels. See Cable Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-611 (1984); see also
Nader & Riley, supra note 8, at 79. In CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973), the Court held that the broadcasters' policy of not selling advertising
time to individuals or groups wishing to address issues of importance to them did not
violate the Communications Act or the first amendment. Id.
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make their channels available to others, save for the limited
exceptions under the remaining content regulations.
The FCC has considered and rejected a number of proposals
that would guarantee access to broadcasting channels for those
denied a license.264 The access proposals were discussed at
length in the 1974 Fairness Report,265 in a 1979 Report and Or-
der,2 6 and more recently in a Report of the Commission that
accompanied the Memorandum Opinion and Order abolishing
the Fairness Doctrine.267
The Committee for Open Media (COM) suggested a volun-
tary plan under which broadcasters would be required to pro-
vide one hour per week for access programming, of which
thirty-five minutes would be set aside for spot messages and
the remaining twenty-five minutes would be reserved for pro-
gram-length presentations.26 According to COM, the proposal
would be less restrictive than the more content-oriented ap-
proach of the Fairness Doctrine.6 9
The Media Access Project (MAP) and the Telecommunica-
tions Research and Action Center (TRAC) jointly proposed es-
tablishing three categories of access users and requiring
broadcasters to set aside 259 minutes per week, or 3.4% of the
broadcast time for a station that broadcasts eighteen hours a
day, for access use.2
The MAP/TRAC proposal called for the establishment of an
264. Some have suggested an access system for the print media. See Barron, Ac-
cess to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1641 (1967).
265. 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 7, at paras. 72-83.
266. In Re The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the
Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 74 F.C.C.2d 163 (1979) [here-
inafter 1979 Fairness Report].
267. 1987 Fairness Report, supra note 224, at paras. 55-100. Access proposals have
not been considered by the Commission since the elimination of the Fairness
Doctrine.
268. One half of the time slots would be offered on a first-come, first-serve basis,
and the other half would be offered on a "representative spokesperson" basis, the
choice of which would be left to the broadcaster's discretion on "predetermined, con-
tent-neutral grounds." An important feature of the COM proposal was that a broad-
caster who chose the access option would be in presumptive compliance with the
Fairness Doctrine. Under the COM plan, the Commission would be limited to exam-
ining the adequacy and compliance of a station's access policy. Id. at paras. 55-62.
269. Id. at para. 56.
270. Under the MAP/TRAC proposal, the following would be entitled to use pub-
lic access: "(1) partisan access users (representatives of established political parties);
(2) nonpartisan access users (representatives of established community and issue-
based organizations); and (3) direct citizen access users (individual citizens)." Id. at
para. 57.
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"access center" in each market to ensure "high-production
quality, effective distribution, and marketwide co-ordina-
tion."27 The center would be funded by broadcasters and
would relieve them of much of the burden of providing access
users with the resources they need to produce program-
ming.272
The system proposed by MAP/TRAC would not be
mandatory. A broadcaster could comply with either current
Fairness Doctrine requirements or with the proposed access
rules. If a broadcaster chose the access option, the "presump-
tions in favor of the broadcaster in a fairness proceeding
would be strengthened. '273
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) proposed an
access plan whereby the licensee would annually determine
ten controversial issues of public importance and provide reply
time on a first-come, first-serve basis to any individual or
group representative who wanted to discuss one of the ten is-
sues. According to the ACLU, this plan would create an "obli-
gation for the broadcaster to spend a reasonable amount of
time on public issues and, in a nondiscriminatory manner, pro-
vide an incentive for members of the public to air their
views. "274
The Commission also considered several proposals that sug-
gested access as a supplement to, rather than a replacement
for, the Fairness Doctrine. One plan would create a non-profit
corporation chartered by Congress that would be granted sixty
minutes of time on each commercial broadcast station each
day during prime-time television and drive time radio. The
corporation, funded by membership dues, would be run by a
board of directors elected by the membership.2 75
271. Id.
272. Id. at para. 58.
273. Id. The MAP/TRAC plan would be a substitute for Fairness Doctrine re-
quirements, but not for other content regulations, including § 315, Zapple situations(appearance by supporters of qualified candidates), political endorsements, and paid
editorial advertising. Id at para. 59.
274. Id. at para. 62.
275. The nonprofit corporation, called "Audience Network," was suggested by
TRAC in supplementary comments. The New York State Consumer Protection
Board (NYCPB) suggested the adoption of a "free programming" requirement to
supplement the Fairness Doctrine. Id. at para. 65. See supra note 22 for a discussion
of Nader's expanded proposal for Audience Network. Geller and Lambert, two indi-
viduals active in regulatory issues, proposed a plan of access that would allow the
public to discuss issues that might be overlooked by the licensee, and permit issues
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Beginning with the 1974 Fairness Report, the Commission
rejected the access proposals because they would increase the
role of government in determining broadcast programming.276
The Commission also held that a system of access on a first-
come, first-serve basis may decrease government involvement,
but could not assure discussion of important issues on a timely
basis.271
The Commission's rejection of the various access proposals
was sharply criticized by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in 1977.278 The court held that the Com-
mission had not given serious consideration to the COM pro-
posal which, in the court's opinion, had "desirable aspects that
the Commission may have overlooked. '279  The court re-
manded the case to the FCC for a better explanation of why
the COM proposal was rejected.280
Upon remand, the FCC again rejected the access proposals
in the 1979 Fairness Report.281 The Commission said it had
carefully studied the proposals, including that of COM, but
concluded that "while the proposal potentially offered a for-
mat which could serve to supplement a licensee's Fairness
Doctrine obligations, no reasonable assurance had been pro-
vided that its implementation could serve as a substitute for
of public importance to be "presented in a partisan fashion." 1987 Fairness Report,
supra note 224, at paras. 63-64.
276. The Commission noted some of the problems:
If the access were free, the government would inevitably be drawn into the
role of deciding who should be allowed on the air and when. This govern-
menial involvement in the day-to-day processes of broadcast journalism
would, we believe, be antithetical to this country's tradition of uninhibited
dissemination of ideas. With regard to ... paid access .... the public inter-
est in providing access to the marketplace ... would scarcely be served by a
system so heavily weighted in favor of the financially affluent ....
1974 Fairness Report, supra note 7, at para. 79 (emphasis in original). See Business
Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Broad-
casters must provide free time to those opposed to the views expressed in paid ads
on controversial issues if no sponsor can be found. See Cullman, supra note 6.
277. Having determined in the 1974 Fairness Report that it had not found any
"scheme of government-dictated access" which it considered "both practical and de-
sirable," the Commission concluded that the public interest would best be served
through "continued reliance on the fairness doctrine which leaves questions of ac-
cess and the specific handling of public issues to the licensee's journalistic discre-
tion." 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 7, at para. 78.
278. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
279. Id. at 1113.
280. Id. at 1113, 1116.
281. 1979 Fairness Report, supra note 266.
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the Fairness Doctrine. 282
In 1985, the Commission, even as it began the process of
abolishing the Fairness Doctrine, concluded that forced access
would not work:
[E]ven though all of these proposals are intended to advance
the First Amendment goals underlying the doctrine and
designed to alleviate problems we have found to be associated
with the fairness doctrine itself, each of them has drawbacks
and shortcomings that, in our opinion, makes access as an al-
ternative even less attractive than the existing fairness
doctrine.28 3
The Commission's rejection of access proposals was sup-
ported by observers who believe that the government has no
business telling journalists, whether print or broadcast, what
should or should not be disseminated.2 8 4 Former FCC Chair-
man Mark Fowler recognized that the courts would not com-
pel commercial broadcasters to allow public access, 285 but
made the controversial argument that public broadcasting sta-
tions can be forced to air programs on controversial issues be-
cause they are government entities (by virtue of receiving
public money), and because they have deviated from their in-
tended purpose by too closely resembling commercial net-
works in the type of programming they offer.28 6 Fowler
argued that because public stations are granted use of frequen-
cies that would otherwise go to commercial broadcasters, they
have special obligations to provide programming that differs
significantly from that offered by commercial networks.287
282. Id. at para. 7. The Commission noted that broadcasters were almost univer-
sally opposed to the idea that access could be used successfully as a substitute for the
Fairness Doctrine. Id. at para. 14.
283. 1987 Fairness Report, supra note 224, at para. 76. The Commission was con-
vinced that increasing the government's role in the access proposals was contrary to
the public interest and would be a further step removed "from according broadcast-
ers the same journalistic freedoms under the First Amendment that are enjoyed by
other private communications media." Id. at para. 88.
284. Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 4, at 156, cites the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), as a point-by~point refutation
of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. Tornillo invalidated a Florida statute that
granted political candidates a right to equal space to reply to criticisms and attacks
by a newspaper. In Tornillo, the Court held: "A responsible press is an undoubtedly
desirable goal, but press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like
many virtues it cannot be legislated." Id. at 256.
285. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 5, at 254.
286. Id. at 250-55.
287. Id. at 252.
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Fowler believes that besides experimental or specialized
programming, public television "can also become a forum for
individual access denied by commercial outlets. Because pub-
lic broadcasters are government funded, it is more likely that
their denial of access to individuals would constitute state ac-
.tion for first amendment purposes. "288
Although rejection of the access proposals appears in the
Commission's report suggesting alternatives to the Fairness
Doctrine,8 9 they have not been formally considered since the
elimination of the doctrine in August 1987. In the current era
in which broadcasters are no longer required under the Fair-
ness Doctrine to present contrasting viewpoints on controver-
sial issues, the debate over access should be renewed. As long
as broadcasting remains a scarce resource, those fortunate
enough to have a license must occasionally "share" their fre-
quency with others.
B. Amending the Communications Act
Since regulation began, a single broadcaster has been able to
operate a station for every hour that it is on the air.29° Con-
gress, in the Radio Act of 1927 and Communications Act of
1934, chose from a number of alternatives in designing a sys-
tem of broadcasting where an individual frequency would not
be shared among various parties.29 ' While Congress clearly
had the right to choose this method of operation for broadcast-
ing, it is equally clear that Congress could have chosen a sys-
tem of enforced sharing.292
The authority of Congress to amend the Communications
288. Id, at 254. The authors' proposal is fraught with problems, not the least of
which is that in Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm., 688 F.2d 1033 (1982), the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that viewers may
not force a public television station to air a program that the station had decided to
cancel. The court distinguished "typical state regulation of private expression" and
the "exercise of editorial discretion by state officials responsible for the operation of
public television stations." Id. at 1044.
289. 1987 Fairness Report, supra note 224, at paras. 54-62.
290. This discussion makes no distinction between stations operating 24 hours a
day and, for example, an AM radio station that operates only during daylight hours.
291. See S.W. HEAD & C.H. STERLING, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA 3-25 (1982); see
also SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, REPORT ON FAIR-
NESS IN BROADCASTING ACT OF 1987, S. REP. No. 34, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1987).
292. This concept was specifically stated in Red Lion. See iqfra notes 293-95 and
accompanying text. The Commission authorized voluntary frequency sharing by
separate broadcast licensees. 47 C.F.R. § 1573.17 (1987).
1989]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J. [Vol. 11:219
Act to grant broadcasters less than one hundred percent ex-
clusive use of a frequency is found in its inherent ability to
regulate interstate commerce293 and was confirmed in Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. Justice White wrote that the
first amendment would not prevent Congress from forcing
broadcasters to share their frequencies. 294
Just as Congress has the power to set aside time for con-
trasting points of view under the Fairness Doctrine, equal
time for candidates under section 315, and reply time under
personal attack and political editorial rules, Congress can
amend the Communications Act to require an access period.295
The fundamental difference between the proposal discussed
below and previous access programs is that this proposal
would not force access upon broadcasters during their time pe-
riod. In fact, this proposal would grant them the first amend-
ment rights they have long sought.
C. Abolishing the Content Regulations and Providing
"Public Access"
Under the "public access" proposal, Congress would amend
the Communications Act to grant broadcasters a license to op-
erate on an assigned frequency for all but one hour per
293. Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm., 62 F.2d 850 (1932)
(commerce clause gave Congress authority to regulate use of radio frequencies); see
also KFKB v. Federal Radio Comm., 47 F.2d 670 (1932); Federal Radio Comm. v.
Nelson Bros., 289 U.S. 266 (1933); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134
(1940); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); NBC v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
294. Justice White wrote:
[A]s far as the First Amendment is concerned those who are licensed stand
no better than those to whom licenses are refused. A license permits broad-
casting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the one who holds
the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow
citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Gov-
ernment from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to
conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those
views and voices which are representative of his community and which
would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves .... Rather
than confer frequency monopolies on a relatively small number of licensees,
in a Nation of 200,000,000, the Government could surely have decreed that
each frequency should be shared among all or some of those who wish to
use it, each being assigned a portion of the broadcast day or the broadcast
week.
Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367, 389-91 (1967).
295. See Walden, The Applicability of State Action Doctrine to Private Broadcast-
ers, 7 HASTINGS COMM/ENT. L.J. 265 (1985).
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week.2" This hour would be reserved by the government for
public access, and thus, a broadcasting license would not in-
clude that one hour period.
The license granted to broadcasters to operate all but one
hour per week would be virtually equal in value to their cur-
rent license. Therefore, in return for the exclusive use of a
valuable public resource for all but one hour per week, broad-
casters would be required to assist those who produce pro-
grams for the public access period. Although a broadcaster's
involvement in public access would require some costs, these
costs would be in lieu of a spectrum-use fee that, in all likeli-
hood, would have been significantly higher.297
What broadcasters gain from such a plan is what they have
sought for many years: full first amendment parity with print
journalists during their time period. Although the elimination
of the Fairness Doctrine and equal time rules can probably be
compensated for in a public access period, some of the other
content regulations, such as the obligation of broadcasters to
make time available to respond to paid editorial announce-
ments, pose more serious problems. Therefore, this proposal
should be instituted for a three-year experimental period and
would have to be renewed by Congress at that time.
Under such a system, if broadcasters during the time period
covered by the license (all but one hour per week) did not
want to present controversial issues of public importance, and
refused to air contrasting points of view on those issues, the
government would have no authority to require them to do so
as it did under the Fairness Doctrine and other content regu-
lations. Marketplace forces, despite their many deficiencies,
would be the sole guarantor that broadcasters act responsibly.
If broadcasters are correct in their assertion that marketplace
competition is sufficient to ensure a commitment to public ser-
296. Compare this with Nader and Riley's proposal that requires one hour of ac-
cess per day. See supra note 22.
297. Broadcasters claim that a spectrum-use fee is an unlawful tax on the press.
See Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722 (1987) (unconstitutional for
state to impose tax on general interest magazines but not on religious, professional,
trade, and sports journals); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm. of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) (unconstitutional for state to impose tax that, among
other things, singles out a few members of the press). See also H.R. 3333, § 414(a),
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 6,849 (1979); S. 611, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125
CONG. REc. 4,628 (1979); S. 622, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 4,887 (1979).
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vice, then those concerned about the potential of broadcasters
to abuse the public trust have little to fear.
In return for being freed from the content regulations,
broadcasters must give up the one hour per week and assist
those who produce programs for the access period. The public
access hour could be modeled after the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984,298 which allows franchising authorities to
require cable operators to provide channels for public access
on both a paid and nonpaid basis and to assist in the training
of those who produce public access programming.299 The Act
replaced FCC rules seeking many of the same goals that were
struck down by the Supreme Court.a" ° Such a scheme, which
has worked fairly well in cable, can be adapted to over-the-air
broadcasting.
Broadcasters, in responding to this proposal, will undoubt-
edly decry the loss of advertising revenue that results from
surrendering one hour per week. 30 1 Before they can success-
298. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2279 (1984) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-611
(Supp. III 1985)). The Act, an amendment to the Communications Act, was designed
primarily to provide a unified national policy regarding cable television and thereby
solve some of the problems caused by various levels (local, state, and federal) of
regulation. See Spilka, An Excess of Access: The Cable Communications Policy Act
of 1984 and First Amendment Protection of Editorial Discretion, 8 CARDOZO L. REV.
317 (1986). See also Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert
denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
299. Section 531 of the Act allows state and municipal franchisors to require the
cable operator to give public, educational, and governmental, programmers access to
the cable system (public access). Section 532 mandates access to certain cable sys-
tems by commercial programmers not affiliated with the cable operator (leased ac-
cess). See Nader & Riley, supra note 8, at 63.
300. In FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979), the Supreme Court over-
turned FCC rules that required cable operators with more than 3,500 subscribers to
make available certain channels for access by the public, educational, local govern-
mental, and leased-access users, and to furnish equipment and facilities for access
purposes. Justice White wrote:
In light of the hesitancy with which Congress approached the access issue in
the broadcast area, and in view of its outright rejection of a broad right of
public access on a common-carrier basis, we are constrained to hold that the
Commission exceeded those limits in promulgating access rules. The Com-
mission may not regulate cable systems as common carriers, just as it may
not impose such obligations on television broadcasters. We think authority
to compel cable operators to provide common carriage of public-originated
transmissions must come specifically from Congress.
Id. at 708-09. Midwest Video was largely reversed by the Cable Policy Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2279. (1984). See also City of Los Angeles v. Preferred
Communications, 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
301. Broadcasters will cite every possible legal argument in fighting such a propo-
sal. They may not, however, claim that such a regulatory proposal would be the
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fully make such an argument, however, broadcasters will have
to explain recent changes in the marketplace that suggest they
could give up an hour a week without suffering dire financial
consequences.
In June 1988, ABC television network executives informed
their affiliates that ABC was considering offering one less
hour of programming each week.3 0 2 The proposal was a reac-
tion to the network's unhappiness that many affiliates were
carrying only twenty-one of the twenty-two hours of program-
ming provided by the network each week.30 3 The network
argued that in an era of declining revenues, it no longer made
financial sense for the network to maintain its current level of
programming if the affiliates were not going to carry all of
it.30 4 The response by the affiliates, who wanted the network
to continue to pay them to run its programs, was unenthusias-
tic.3 0 5 Affiliates do not want to compete in the open market-
place by having to purchase expensive syndicated
programming.
ABC appeared most interested in cutting back on its Satur-
day night programming, when so many viewers are apparently
watching programs on VCR's that it is difficult for the net-
works to make a profit.0° If 8:00 p.m. on Saturday is the hour
equivalent of taking property without compensation in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Broadcasters do not own the frequencies they use, and
the costs involved for them (loss of revenue and cost of production for public access)
can be imposed in lieu of a spectrum-use fee. The loss of advertising revenue and
costs associated with assisting with production for the public access period will not
materially affect the value of a broadcaster's license. It is hard to imagine that a
television station worth hundreds of millions of dollars would be worth significantly
less because of this proposal.
302. ABC-TV to Affiliates: Use Us or Lose Us, BROADCASTING, June 13, 1988, at 27.
303. The network was especially unhappy about affiliates who preempt network
programs during prime time and in the 6 to 7 a.m. time slot when affiliates replace
network shows with local news programs. Id.
304. One executive estimated the loss to the network because of the preemptions
in the "10's of millions" of dollars. Id. The combined audience share for the three
major networks has dropped from over 90% of television homes to 75%. Ratings
Down 10%, Shares Off Four Points, BROADCASTING, November 9, 1987, at 35.
305. To Give or Take an Hour, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, June 20, 1988, at 12.
306. Left on their own, local stations would undoubtedly fill that extra hour with
game shows and other syndicated programming fare. As the editors of Electronic
Media noted: "Certainly the stations would survive having an extra hour to program
and, indeed, they would probably thrive. The history of the prime-time access period
indicates that the availability of profitable syndicated programming expands to fill
the available time slots." Id.
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that neither networks nor local affiliates especially want to
program, it may be the perfect time for public access.
While the public access hour will vary significantly from one
community to another, several purposes seem most suited to a
public access system. The first purpose is to provide a forum
for discussion of issues not covered during the licensee's por-
tion of the week and to present contrasting viewpoints on
those issues not aired during that time period. The similarity
to the Fairness Doctrine is obvious, but the fact that the Doc-
trine no longer exists does not make its goals any less impor-
tant. The public access period would allow those who feel a
station is ignoring important issues, or presenting them un-
fairly, to offer that perspective to the public. It would allow
more detailed inquiry into issues covered only superficially by
a broadcasting station in news or public affairs programming.
The second purpose is to create a forum for examining the
performance of the licensee, facilitated through an ombuds-
man or a program that offers the equivalent of a "Letters to
the Editor" section of a newspaper. Broadcasting historically
has done an extremely poor job of examining itself. With the
exception of an occasional program that offers some self-criti-
cism, most stations and networks do not provide a forum for
complaints about their programming. If the public, for exam-
ple, is dissatisfied with a station's news coverage, it should be
provided an opportunity to air those views and criticize both
the overall news philosophy of the station and individual
stories.
The third purpose, although there would have to be some
limits, is to provide access to groups that wish to purchase
time for the presentation of issues. It will have to be decided
whether those paying for time during the access period will be
chosen on a first-come, first-serve basis, or on some other ba-
sis. While there is always the danger that the most affluent
groups will dominate the access hour, some method must be
developed that will provide a balance between individual citi-
zens and well-funded groups.
As with cable operators under section 351(e) of the Cable
Policy Act, those controlling public access would not be able to
censor programs, with the exception of obscene material.0 7 A
307. "[Except for control over obscenity], a cable operator shall not exercise any
editorial control over any public, educational, or governmental use of channel capac-
ity provided pursuant to this section." For the definition of obscenity, see Miller v.
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decision would have to be made whether a program that is po-
tentially libelous could be censored. If no censorship was al-
lowed, producers of public access programming would have to
be protected from suits for defamation or invasion of privacy.
D. Implementation of Public Access
The public access proposal suggested here is obviously very
controversial. It will be difficult for even its strongest propo-
nents to get Congress to approve such a fundamental change
in the way broadcasting frequencies are allocated. Once en-
acted, numerous problems will have to be solved before an ac-
cess system will work.0 8 Broadcasters could not, however,
object to this proposal on constitutional grounds because the
one hour per week access period does not belong to them. In
fact, their constitutional rights will be enhanced by the elimi-
nation of some or all of the content regulations during the
time covered by their license.
Among the most difficult problems to solve in implementing
public access will be:
1) Should all stations be required to relinquish one hour per
week for public access? Some might argue that stations in the
largest broadcasting markets should be exempt on the grounds
that there are enough stations to offer discussion of all impor-
tant community issues. They would assert that markets with
fewer stations, which may have closer ties to local political and
business interests, are most in need of a public access period
where controversial issues can be considered. Others might
argue that because all stations need ratings to survive finan-
cially and thus want to offend the fewest viewers, public ac-
cess is needed for the discussion of provocative ideas that
would not otherwise be aired.
2) What limits should there be on the costs that broadcast-
ers incur for loss of revenue for the public access period and
the cost of providing production help?3 0 9 Because programs
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Under the Communications Act, broadcasters may not
censor material submitted under § 315 (equal time rules). See Farmers Educ. and
Coop. Union of Am. v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
308. It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a detailed plan for implemen-
tation of the public access period. Nevertheless, if Congress were determined to pro-
vide a system, it is likely that implementation problems could be solved.
309. Production costs could easily be tied to market size. The larger the broadcast
market, the larger the limit on costs for preparing public access programs. This cost
would, in any case, be significantly less than what would have been required if Con-
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produced by experienced broadcast professionals are generally
far superior to those produced for cable public access, it is es-
sential that there be some incentive for broadcasters to coop-
erate in producing access programming.
3) Who determines what is aired during the public access
period? This would clearly be the most difficult issue. The
access proposals submitted by several public interest groups
and individuals31° provide a number of ideas for a system to
allocate the public access period. Those ideas, or some combi-
nation thereof, would lead to an access system that could be
tried on an experimental basis. A board composed of individ-
ual citizens responsible for public access on each station could
be elected to serve on a rotating basis to decide what issues
will be presented during the public access period. If there is
no citizen board for a particular station, or if the board
chooses not to air programs for that particular week, the hour
reverts to the licensee to be used in whatever way it chooses.
4) What hour should broadcasters give up? If left to them
to decide, each will undoubtedly give up its least valuable
hour, meaning the hour when fewest people are listening or
watching. This would result in the public access hour being
aired in the middle of the night or the early hours of the
morning when the audience is smallest, thus defeating the
purpose of providing the public with access to controversial is-
sues of public importance. If all broadcasters give up the same
hour each week, listeners and viewers will be limited to only
one hour of access programming. Ideally, each broadcaster in
a market will surrender a different hour during a time of the
week when a large portion of the public will be able to tune
in.
An important element in this access proposal is the coopera-
tion of broadcasters. Such cooperation is not likely to be
purely voluntary, but will instead require encouragement
from the FCC. The Commission is considering changes to the
comparative renewal process to insulate broadcasters from
challenges to their licenses."' 1 Under this access proposal, one
gress had imposed a spectrum-use fee. Cable operators incur costs related to main-
taining public access studios and the training of people to produce programs.
Perhaps Congress could offer broadcasters a tax break to help compensate for the
loss of revenue during the public access period.
310. See supra notes 263-89 and accompanying text.
311. Broadcasters argue that the comparative renewal process subjects them to
harassment, if not extortion, by those filing renewal challenges with the FCC. The
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criterion for license renewal should be the extent to which a
broadcaster has cooperated with public access authorities. If
the broadcaster has made an affirmative effort to provide
assistance to those using public access, that should reflect posi-
tively on the broadcaster at the time of renewal.
The quality of the public access programming will obviously
vary greatly. Currently, much public access programming on
cable is unwatchable. The quality of the video is often poor,
and audiences are not attracted to programs that offer nothing
more than two individuals sitting around a table with a green
plant discussing community problems. In order to attract an
audience, the public access production must include high-qual-
ity video shot outside the studio, which may require the active
involvement of the TV station. When high-quality video is
combined with interesting in-studio guests, the program is
more likely to attract a loyal audience.
Broadcasters who strenuously object to this proposal need to
be reminded that they do not own the frequencies they use,
and if Congress believes a public access period should be tried,
broadcasters will have to learn to cooperate with those pro-
gramming the public access hour.s12
There is much in this proposal for broadcasters. They
would finally be freed of the content regulations they have de-
spised for so long. They could be given financial incentives
that compensate for loss of revenue and the cost of assisting
those producing public access programming. The frequency
would remain theirs to use for all but one hour per week
when they would suspend normal programming to provide a
forum for viewers to criticize or praise the station, discuss im-
Commission has long been concerned about huge payoffs made by broadcasters to
get challengers to drop their petitions. Recently, stations have tried to limit those
costs to the legal expenses of the challenger. In June 1988, the CBS-owned station
in Chicago, WBBM-TV, agreed to pay the legal expenses of a group that had chal-
lenged its license, about $190,000, in return for the group withdrawing its application.
Settlement Reached in WBBM-TV Chicago Challenge, BROADCASTING, July 18, 1988,
at 33. See FCC Investigates Alleged Process Abuser, BROADCASTING, July 25, 1988, at
81.
312. It would be wrong to underestimate the ability of broadcasters to defeat pro-
posals they do not consider to be in their interest. Broadcasters are well financed
and often well organized. The National Association of Broadcasters, for example,
had a budget of $13.4 million in 1987, Closed Circuit, BROADCASTING, Aug. 31, 1987,
at 7, and along with cable and motion picture political action committees, handed out
$1.1 million in 1986. PAC's Dole Out $1.1 Million in 1986, BROADCASTING, May 4,
1987, at 64.
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portant issues, and explore unorthodox ideas. Considering the
suspicion with which some people hold broadcasting, embrac-
ing the public access proposal may enhance the industry's pub-
lic image. The criticism of the station that may be aired
during the public access period may at times be painful for the
broadcaster, but could in the long run improve the image of
the industry in the eyes of a public that has, for too long, felt
excluded from using broadcasting frequencies that they own.
Conclusion
Sixty years of experience have demonstrated the difficulty
of regulating broadcasting in the public interest without
abridging the constitutional rights of broadcasters. The Fair-
ness Doctrine, the most controversial of all content regula-
tions, is clearly unworkable. Even when the FCC is
determined to actively regulate in the public interest, the Fair-
ness Doctrine cannot achieve its intended goals. During the
past eight years, the FCC has demonstrated how meaningless
the Doctrine is in the hands of those who believe the market-
place, and not government, ought to regulate broadcasting.
There is no reasonable method by which the Fairness Doc-
trine can be fairly and uniformly enforced. At the same time,
broadcasters are not entitled to monopolistic use of a valuable
frequency, with its potentially large commercial value, to the
exclusion of all other voices.
Congress is faced now with an opportunity to change the
way broadcasting is regulated. It should abandon efforts to en-
act the Fairness Doctrine, and should instead amend the Com-
munications Act to create a public access period. While such a
proposal raises many difficult issues and cannot be easily im-
plemented, it has the potential to provide broadcasters with
the full first amendment rights they have long sought, while
at the same time protecting and enhancing the public's inter-
est in broadcasting.
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